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The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the 
University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. 
 
These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which 
will conclude in the Spring of 2003.  The purpose of this Convention is to submit proposals for 
a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union.  While the European Union 
has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must 
take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its 
objectives at home and abroad.  The main issues of this Convention are Europe’s role in the 
international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement 
process.  In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making 
processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization.  
During the Convention proceedings, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to 
provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze  various 
aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event. 
 
The following is a list of tentative topics for this series: 
 
1.  The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return 
to intergovernmental cooperation? 
 
2.  How will the member states figure in the framework of the Convention? 
 
3.  The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe. 
 
4.  Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention? 
 
5.  The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the 
European capitals. 
 
6.  Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration. 
 
7.  Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia 
Convention of 1787. 
 
8.  The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world. 
 
9.  How important is European integration to the United States today? 
 
10.  The failure of a necessary partnership?  Do the United States and the European Union 
necessarily have to understand each other?  Under what conditions? 
 
11.  Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European 
Union and Russia? 
 
12.  Russia: a member of the European Union?  Who would be interested in this association? 
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una extrema tension,” commissioned by Real Instituto Elcano, Análisis, abril 2003 
(http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/274.asp).  This text also reflects updated portions of two 
previous working papers: “The European Anchoring of Cuba: From Persuasion and Good Intentions to 
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anonymous.  Compilation of Spanish news sources was selectively facilitated by the Ministry of Foreign 
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Europa y América (México: UNAM, 2002).  His over 1,200 columns and essays have been appearing in 
newspapers and magazines in Spain, the United States and Latin America.  
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THE EUROPEAN UNION PERCEPTION OF CUBA: 
FROM FRUSTRATION TO IRRITATION 
 
 
 
Fidel Castro dramatically selected the commemoration of the 50
th anniversary of his failed 
attack against the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953, for his 
rejection of any kind of humanitarian assistance, economic cooperation, and political 
dialogue with the European Union (EU) and its Member States, signaling one of the lowest 
points in European-Cuban relations.
1  Just days before the anniversary of what history 
would later recognize as the prelude to the Cuban Revolution, the European Union’s 
Foreign Relations Council issued a harsh criticism of the regime’s latest policies and 
personal insults against some European leaders (notably, Spain’s José María Aznar), in 
essence freezing all prospects of closer relations. The overall context was, of course, the 
global uncertainty of the U.S. occupation of Iraq in the aftermath of the post-September 11 
tension. Having survived the end of the Cold War and the perennial U.S. harassment, the 
Castro regime seemed to have lost its most precious alternative source of international 
cooperation, if not economic support.            
 
           
An Overall Assessment 
 
In April 2003 an extremely serious crisis affected Cuba’s international relations, and most 
especially its link with Europe. It was the result of the harshness of the reprisals against the 
dissidents and the death sentences imposed on three hijackers of a ferry. These 
developments pushed back a series of rapprochement measures maintained by the 
European Union and most of its member states with the expectation of contributing to 
facilitate the political transition at the expected end of the Castro regime. In spite of the 
fact that the Cuban government justified its actions in view of the perceived threat 
presented by the increased activity of the internal opposition and the backing provided by 
the U.S. government to the dissidents, the bluntness of the response (disproportionate 
imprisonment and summary executions by firing squad) was too much to swallow.  
  
The measures generated an unprecedented world-wide protest not limited to the usual 
conservative sectors in the United States and the Cuban exile community. Traditionally 
tamed governments in Europe made explicit protests, while important backers of the 
Cuban regime abandoned their endorsement, changing it for a straight denunciation. In the 
European context, the serious deterioration caught the EU institutions flat-footed, with the 
result that once again a possible cooperative arrangement became doubtful.
2 After careful 
consideration, prefaced by intended measures to be taken by several member states, the 
institutional framework of the EU acted accordingly. The European Parliament passed a 
Resolution and the Council adopted conclusions condemning Cuba. The Commission 
announced on May 1, 2003, the freezing of the procedure to consider the admission of 
Cuba into the Africa-Pacific-Caribbean (ACP) Cotonou Agreement.
3 In essence, this 
                                                             
1 See his speech at Santiago de Cuba, on July 26, 2003, “Calumniar y sancionar a Cuba, además de 
injusto y cobarde, es ridículo,” Granma, 27 julio 2003. 
www.granma.cubaweb.cu/2003/07/27/nacional/articulo24.html. Appendix XII. 
2 AFP, “Prisión a disidentes traba acuerdos con la Unión Europea,” El Nuevo Herald, 1 abril 2003. 
  
3For general information, consult the EU Commission website: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/development_old/cotonou/index_en.htm     
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decision pushed back the EU-Cuba relationship to a low level, similar to the one existing 
in 1996 when the EU voted a Common Position (CP)
4 conditioning a full European 
cooperation package to reforms to be made by the Cuban regime.
5 This time it was not the 
Cuban regime’s withdraw of the application process, as it did in 2000, but the decision of 
the European Union not to continue with the negotiations. As expected, however, Cuba 
decided to again withdraw its application in order to avoid an embarrassing rejection. From 
a dubious attitude and the absence of a clear single policy on Cuba, now the EU appeared 
to have confirmed an effective common policy.  
 
On June 5, the Presidency (held by Greece) of the EU issued an unprecedented 
blistering declaration on Cuba’s “deplorable actions” in “violating fundamental freedoms,” 
demanding the immediate release of “all political prisoners,” and calling on EU member 
states to limit high-level government visits to Cuba, to reduce the profile of participation in 
cultural events, and to invite dissidents to national day celebrations.
6 On July 21, the EU 
Council of Foreign Affairs issued a conclusion using some of the crudest terms labeling 
Cuba’s latest actions, confirming the previously announced sanctions of a mostly political 
nature.
7 The EU demanded the release of political prisoners, denounced the manipulation 
of an anti-drug trafficking campaign for internal repression, condemned Cuba’s 
demonstrations against European embassies, and expected a new attitude of the Cuban 
government, conditioning all future assistance on political and economic reforms.
8 In sum, 
from a policy of persuasion, the EU had expressed first frustration in expecting signs of 
reform from Cuba, and finally issued unequivocal signs of irritation.
9  
 
In contrast with the apparent cohesion of EU’s policies on Cuba, variation has been 
the order of the day regarding European national attitudes towards Cuba, explaining the 
lack of a cohesive, well-coordinated policy, to the frequent (behind the scenes) dismay 
of the staff of the European Commission.
10 For example, while Belgium can usually be 
labeled as a neutral observer, more critical when led by conservatives than by Social 
Democrats, Austria prefers a cultural approach, and the most critical states are led by 
Sweden’s “Nordic fundamentalism” based on pressures to respect human rights. 
Germany has opted for a gradual rapprochement and the UK tilts towards change 
through trade and cooperation. The special relationship between Spain and Cuba has 
neutralized most of the hard line attitude tested by Prime Minister José María Aznar 
after coming to power in 1996. Italy has replicated the engagement policy of France, 
while Portugal has inserted Cuba into its Latin American foreign policy. Direct 
                                                             
4 See Appendix I. 
5 For a review of these events, see my book entitled Cuba, the United States and the Helms-Burton 
Doctrine: International Reactions Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2000. 
6Declaration, Presidency of the European Union, June 5, 2003. See Appendix X. 
7 EFE, “Europa prepara su crítica más dura contra Castro,” El Nuevo Herald, 12 julio 2003; AFP, “EU to 
Launch New Attack on Cuba,” July 17, 2003. 
8 See my commentaries: “Triste aniversario del Moncada,” La Opinión de Los Angeles, 22 julio 2003 
(www.laopinion.com/editorial.artopinion.htm.html?rkey=003072213501613982); and “Cuba: un trist 
aniversari,” Avui, 25 juliol 2003 (www.avui.es/avui/diari/03/jul/25/100125.htm); “De Bruselas al 
Moncada”, La Clave (Madrid); El Nuevo Herald, 1 agosto 2003 
(www.miami.com/mld/elnuevo/news/opinion/6429749.htm?template=contentModules/… 8/2/2003).  
9 See my commentary: “Unión Europea-Cuba: de la frustración a la irritación,” La Opinión de Los 
Angeles, 20 mayo 2003; “La Unión Europea ante Cuba,” El Nuevo Herald, 13 mayo 2003. 
10For an expanded comment, see Susanne Gratius, “Cuba: un caso aparte en la política exterior de la 
Unión Europea,” in Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez, eds. Las relaciones exteriores de la Unión 
Europea, (México: UNAM, 2000), pp. 261-272.  
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government contacts have multiplied in recent years and only Finland does not have an 
embassy in Havana (only for economic reasons).
11  
 
In the meanwhile, the European media ceased to look at Cuba through the lenses of 
the Cold War, which has resulted in mixed views in the political analyses of the Castro 
regime. In general, European newspapers seem to recognize the advances of the Cuban 
Revolution, while they are more critical of the human rights violations and economic 
weaknesses of the regime. Understandably, this pattern has drastically changed since the 
incidents of April 2003. In terms of volume, Cuba seems to enjoy disproportionate 
attention in the European media considering the relative value of the country in global 
trade and economic terms. While the British press seems to be more objective, in Spain 
Cuban affairs can turn into the subject of debate at the level of internal politics. Political 
parties are equally subdivided into ultra conservatives rejecting direct contact with 
Castro, far-left nostalgics retaining loyalties to the Cuban Revolution, and the majority 
of the rest favoring a critical dialogue as the best way to guarantee a peaceful transition. 
Most lively on Cuban affairs are the European NGOs (church organizations, 
universities, foundations) dealing with Cuba, as well as regional and local governments, 
especially in Spain and Italy.
12 Pax Christi, one of the most vocal and influential church-
related NGOs, has issued critical reports on European links with Cuba.
13  In any event, 
as we see in the last part of this study, media, intellectuals, and political forces 
exhausted their confidence in the Cuban potential for reform as a result of the serious 
April 2003 events.     
 
On the economic scene, activities between Cuba and Europe have been increasing in 
the last decade. Trade has doubled. EU exports to Cuba topped €1.43 billion in 2001 
(44% from Spain, followed by Italy and France). Cuban imports in Europe were in the 
amount of €581 million (54% in the Netherlands, followed by Spain). Two thirds of 
Cuba’s imports from developed countries come from the EU. Bilateral development aid 
and tourism are two of the most important sources of European involvement in Cuba. 
Almost 70% of cooperation assistance comes from Europe, led by Spain (16.8%), 
followed by the Commission. Italian tourists are the leaders (13%) in a key sector for 
the Cuban economy. European direct investment in Cuba is over 50% of total foreign 
investment, with Spain covering 25%, followed by Italy with 13%.
14 Of the 400 
investment consortia, 105 are with Spanish companies, followed by Canada (60) and 
Italy (57).
15 Considering this impressive level of engagement, it is not surprising that 
only Sweden does not have a bilateral cooperation agreement with Cuba, and ten 
European countries have investment protection agreements with Havana. Spain leads 
the European pack with the number of agreements of different kinds with the Cuban 
government, followed by Italy, the country that in 1993 inaugurated the investment 
protection pacts.
16            
 
 
                                                             
11 IRELA, “Revision of European Policy on Cuba,” pp. 17-21. 
12 IRELA, “Revision,” pp. 25-26. 
13The European Union and Cuba; Solidarity or Complicity?, September 2000. 
http://www.cubacenter.org/media/recent_briefs/paxchristi.html 
14 IRELA, “Revision,” pp. 27-34; Comisión Europea, Cuba y la Unión Europea, 2003. 
15 EFE, “Mayoría de inversores en Cuba provienen de la UE”, Diario las Américas, 9 febrero 2003. 
16 IRELA, “Revision,” p. 34. 
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The ACP: A Back Door to the EU? 
 
Whatever is the evaluation of the relationship between Cuba and individual European 
countries, the stark reality is that Cuba is the only Latin American country that still does 
not enjoy a bilateral cooperation agreement with the EU. A search through the official 
EU web pages could (and still does to a great extent) generate a sense of confusion and 
frustration because Cuba does not have a place like any other Latin American country in 
the External Relations structure of the Commission and until very recently did not 
occupy a specific place in the framework of the Directorate General for Development 
(formerly called DG VIII).
17 With the derailment in the year 2000 of the process 
towards the signing of the post-Lomé agreements, EU officers dealing with the Cuba 
dossier used to joke that they were commissioned to take care of the ACP… and Cuba, 
with no documents, while all the files were frozen in the Directorate General of External 
Relations (formerly DG Ib), and the EU Commission delegation in Mexico was in 
theory accredited to Havana.  
 
This anomaly was further complicated when Cuba became a member of the ACP 
countries without being a signatory of the Cotonou agreements, successor of Lomé. 
Nonetheless, Europe as a whole has been Cuba’s most important trade and investment 
source, replacing the Soviet Union as Havana’s main commercial partner. With the 
vanishing of the Soviet Bloc, Europe has been able to afford to accept Cuban 
exceptionalism and has developed what can be labeled as “conditioned constructive 
compromise” based more on the carrot than the stick. But, until very recently, Brussels 
has barely used its economic leverage to pressure Cuba on a political level. The peculiar 
political structure of the EU has helped reinforce this weakness.  European persuasion 
has been reduced to the spirit and the content of the Common Position of 1996, which in 
turn owes its development to the aftermath of the confrontation between the EU and the 
United States over the Helms-Burton law.
18 
 
The Common Position, approved under the Spanish conservative leadership in the 
fall of 1996, renewed every six months, is a pre-condition for a bilateral agreement 
between the EU and Cuba, a clause that has been explicitly rejected by Havana.
19 It 
calls for a pacific transition to a pluralist democracy, preferably led from the top, with 
the benefit of development aid being channeled through European and Cuban NGOs. 
Observers have noted that this Common Position is void in view of the volume of 
bilateral relations with the majority of the most important member states. It has been 
basically violated by Cuba’s most important partner, Spain, both in terms of trade and 
aid, under both socialist and conservative governments. Only the Nordic countries seem 
to respect the terms of the position. The result of this mixed message is that Cuba has 
not taken seriously the tough attitude emanating from the EU common institutions.     
 
                                                             
17See current format (May 2003): 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=cu&lng=en&status=old
#overview  See general web: http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm 
18 Richard Nuccio, “The USA and Cuba”, in Richard Haas (ed.), Trans-Atlantic Tensions: The United 
States, Europe and Problem Countries. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999, pp. 7-29. 
19 Eduardo Perera, “Condicionalidad y condicionamientos previos en la cooperación al desarrollo de la 
Unión Europea” en Revista de Estudios Europeos, La Habana, núm. 53/54, 2000, pp. 3-33.  
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A rough picture of the attitudes of the different member states on Cuba’s 
prospective Cotonou membership shows a southern bloc composed of Spain (with its 
own internal contradictions of economic engagement and political confrontation with 
Cuba), Portugal, Italy and France acting as main proponents. In contrast Germany, the 
UK and Sweden seem to distance themselves in the political dimension. Less influential 
in world affairs, Austria, Belgium and Finland don’t have much at stake in the 
Caribbean and Latin America. A group of “blockers” (Finland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the UK) seem to slow down the process of the post-Lomé arrangement, 
while “openers” (France, Portugal, Spain and Italy) favor a positive approach. 
“Mediators” (Austria, Belgium and Germany) remain ready to serve accordingly.
20          
 
It is also a fact that institutional relations have been recently difficult for two kinds 
of reasons. The first is composed of uncomfortable personal linkages and references, not 
by chance implicating Spanish officials. When a deal seemed to be close in early 1996, 
the insistence of Commissioner Manuel Marín on the human rights issues became an 
insurmountable obstacle.
21 The cloudy atmosphere has worsened since a new 
Commission was established. In 1999, Javier Solana, the new High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, was insulted by the Cuban leadership, 
claiming that he was endorsing U.S. policies. At some times, there appeared to be 
friction between the EU officers and Cuban ministers during the Lomé negotiations. 
The second origin of difficulties seems to derive from external crises. Stemming back to 
the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, the controversy over the Elián 
González crisis, and protests against U.S. interference were extended to cover all 
foreign activities in Cuba.  
 
In any event, and in spite of all difficulties, the road to a post-Lomé deal seemed to 
be on a sure path, initiated in Brussels in September 1998
22 and culminating in the 
signing of the new agreement on June 23, 2000, in Cotonou. Havana was not dealing 
now with one office in Brussels but with a multilateral outfit of 77 countries. In essence, 
the switch of Cuba’s position in the EU structure from the Latin American context to 
the post-Lomé cooperation framework was dictated by a political decision to send a 
message to Cuba that the insertion in the Cotonou setting was the best option and that 
the political dimensions were downsized. However, Castro rejected the procedure, and 
withdrew the application intention,
23 claiming the Resolution issued by the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission in its annual gathering was one-sided, and 
suspended the scheduled visit of the Troika.
24 Ironically, the overall climate for Cuban 
membership in Lomé was positive, shifting towards a normalization of the EU-Cuba 
relationship, this time anchored in the ACP multilateral context.
25 Only some European 
governments seemed to oppose, led by the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
According to evident signals, the UK apparently threatened to veto the arrangement 
                                                             
20IRELA, “Revision of European Policy on Cuba?” p. 1. 
21 Nuccio, op. cit. 
22 Francesc Granell, “Cuba y la Unión Europea: del encuadre latinoamericano al ACP 
caribeño“, in Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación, núm. 3, Madrid 1998. 
23 For an academic analysis from the Cuban point of view, see Hilda Puerta Rodríguez, “El Acuerdo de 
Cotonou y el posible ingreso de Cuba,” Revista de Estudios Europeos, No. 60, 2002, pp 3-24. 
24 Resolution on Cuba presented by Poland and the Czech Republic. 
25 IRELA, Revision of the European Policy towards Cuba: Perceptions and Interests of the EU Member 
States, Madrid, 2000. 
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once it would come to be discussed by the Council. Consequently, Cuba then branded 
the EU conditions as “arrogant”, “unacceptable”, and dependent on the “U.S. policy”.
26  
 
Supporters of Cuba’s membership and most neutral observers considered the Cuban 
reaction as unexpected and violent. In fact, the decision was a slap in the face of ACP 
members that advocated Cuba’s membership. ACP diplomats in Brussels confessed on 
the record to being surprised, although off-the-record seasoned ambassadors suspected 
the outcome and were not caught off guard.
27 EU Commission officers expressed 
tongue-in-cheek satisfaction for what they feared was the result of hard work with high 
expectations. Evidence shows that the decision was taken after a complete internal 
debate on the cost and benefits. The Cuban government figured that the economic 
benefits were not an adequate compensation for the loss of political independence and 
the insertion into a multilateral dialogue of unforeseeable consequences when dealing 
with democracy and human rights. In a gathering of high government officials of the 
Caribbean and Central America, off the record, Castro called the deal “demasiado 
fastidio para tan poca plata” [too big of a nuisance for so little money].”
28 This 
euphemistic ocurrencia, an apparently innocent remark, became an omen of a more 
serious incident to come in April of 2003, confirming the worst suspicions about the 
priorities of the Cuban regime regarding the European linkages.   
 
However, some months later, in the sequel to this mini-drama, on December 14, 
2000, and to the surprise of many observers, Cuba became the 78
th member of the ACP 
group. The novelty of the event is that Cuba joined without signing the Cotonou 
convention.
29 For the confusion of experts and unguarded observers, this anomaly led 
some to believe that Cuba had in fact obtained the same benefits. This is not the case. 
 
      In reality, the charter of this organization (in essence, an international organization 
like any other) had to be amended to provide for a new member that will not use the 
only and unique service of the organization: the trade and cooperation benefits from EU 
member states. In comparative metaphorical terms, Cuba’s membership in the ACP is 
like belonging to an exclusive golf club without being able to play golf, only watching 
others play and walking around the facilities.
30 Seasoned observers may point out that 
this is another example of an EU compromise to accommodate for difficult 
circumstances and give the impression to the three parties (the EU member states, the 
ACP countries and Cuba) that they have won something in the preparation of Cuba 
becoming a full member some day. Harsher critics of the overall picture may claim that 
this only reveals a certain degree of absurdity with no substantial results. However, this 
odd solution only reflects that the ACP group is composed of sovereign states that 
endorsed Cuba’s membership. While some member states expressed reluctance, the EU 
accepted the ACP wishes and pointed out to the Cotonou procedure. The result is the 
current split solution, void by the explicit rejection of any EU assistance issued by 
Castro on July 26, 2003.            
    
 
                                                             
26 Granma, 29 abril de 2000. 
27 Interviews carried out in Brussels and the Caribbean during the months of July and August 2000. 
28 Literal quote from a Caribbean high government official.   
29 See statement in ACP web: http://www.acpsec.org/gb/press/146b034e.html 
30 Georgetown Agreement of 1992. 
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EU Standing Showcases 
 
During all this time, it has been reasonably expected that the EU would continue the 
policy of persuading Cuba towards a political reform. Brussels would also maintain a 
limited profile of normalcy with Havana in the diplomatic field, stressing that the door 
of opportunity regarding the ACP deal was open.  
 
As an example of the obvious contradiction between bilateral engagement and 
supranational conditioning, the record shows that the EU has collectively demonstrated 
impressive coherence on two fronts in the context of the United Nations. On the one 
hand, the EU member states bloc has opposed the embargo and the Helms-Burton law.
31 
This is a sign of the slow but steady build up of an incipient EU common foreign policy.  
Europe can muster a much superior solidarity than the one that seems to be absent in 
Latin America. Moreover, in the annual conference of the Human Rights Commission, 
Europe is highly unified. In contrast, the Latin American countries seem to go their 
separate ways, although there was an improvement in the 2002 vote, but the split 
reappeared in 2003, in part further confused by the opposition of most Latin American 
governments to the war in Iraq.  
 
Since 1996, the year of the approval of Helms-Burton and the subsequent passage of 
the Common Position on Cuba, the European states have maintained a solid bloc 
attitude on both items. Not only have the EU members voted in unison, but they have 
tried to do so in conjunction with the candidate countries that expect to join the Union in 
the near future, in compliance (although not legally binding, with the result of certain 
exceptions) with the rule of coherence to foreign policy. It would be a sign of bad 
initiation rites if candidates voted differently in international settings than the EU 
member states. In contrast, Latin American governments seem to have at least three 
fronts regarding Cuba. Some vote for, some abstain, and some others oppose, according 
to circumstances or changes in the executives.
32 
 
Other diplomatic moves show a certain degree of ambivalence and contradiction 
depending on the prevailing circumstances, who is holding the EU presidency, and what 
kind of individual conflicts and priorities member states have regarding Cuba. For 
example, in one of the attempts to speed up the process of a closer relationship with 
Cuba, Belgium Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Louis Michel, holding the 
presidency of the EU, visited Havana in August of 2001, raising expectations in EU 
circles and irritation in Cuba, as well as concerns in the U.S. Department of State. The 
Cuban government officially considered the visit in its Belgium dimension, while Spain 
(as next EU presidency) demoted its representation in the Troika to the minimum. The 
visit, announced to the EU Commission with barely five days notice, served to 
somewhat smooth the friction between Brussels and Havana caused by the ballot cast in 
the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The EU wanted to send a message of 
holding the door open and the Cuban government managed to show that it counted on 
Brussels’ understanding, especially during the Belgium presidency. This linkage was 
predicted to be more difficult during the Spanish presidency in the first semester of 
2002, with Madrid heavily pressed by crucial EU pending issues, such as the debate on 
the future of Europe, the plans for enlargement, and economic dimensions in the new 
                                                             
31 See my book Cuba, the United States, and the Helms-Burton Doctrine, chapter 5, pp. 105-129. 
32 See my column “Coherencia europea, vacilación latinoamericana,” El Nuevo Herald, 18 abril 2001.  
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euro era. A new run of disagreement with Brussels while Spain was at the wheel of the 
EU might not have been the most beneficial outcome for any party, but it might have 
tactically helped Castro as it has on other occasions.
33  
 
In the absence of the standard bi-lateral cooperation framework agreement, the 
standing EU policy towards Cuba can be subdivided into three main areas. The first one 
is a relationship based on humanitarian grounds; the second is an attitude towards the 
anchoring of Cuba in its natural Caribbean habitat; the third, and most complex, is the 
setting of the wider ACP framework.  
 
Regarding humanitarian assistance, the EU record shows that the funds provided by 
the Commission have increased in the line of cooperation assistance delivered through 
NGOs during the past five years: from 0.6 M€ in 1997 to 5.4 M€ in 2001, with a peak of 
8.2 M€ in 2000. Waiting for quality proposals, the Commission has been considering it 
essential to ensure that NGO projects meet the criteria of financial and institutional 
sustainability, to allow for long-term impact at the beneficiary level. In the view of 
Brussels, if properly conducted and monitored, NGO cooperation may therefore 
effectively contribute to the development of the incipient civil society in Cuba.
34 
 
With respect to humanitarian aid and development assistance, this variance on a 
programmable basis was phased out. A comprehensive evaluation conducted in 
April/May 2000 concluded that Cuba was no longer in a state of emergency. Before 
2000 Cuba received sums sometimes reaching €30 million per year, a level that was 
reduced after the failure of the cooperation agreement in 1996. A humanitarian aid 
allocation of €8 million was channeled through the 2001 European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) funds. In addition, the Commission allocated €0.5 million 
to address the emergency needs of the affected population in the region of Matanzas, in 
the wake of Hurricane Michelle (November 4, 2001). In sum, the record shows that 
since 1993 the EU has financed close to €125 million of assistance measures, of which 
nearly two thirds have been in the field of humanitarian aid. It is estimated that some 
16% of the Cuban population has benefited from this aid. Following the Commission 
decision to phase out humanitarian aid, measures supporting economic reform and civil 
society development have been increasing. Assistance of this type to Cuba would 
continue as long as programmable funds are not available. It was expected that, on 
average, between €15 and 18 million would be used for development programs in 
Cuba.
35  
 
The exception made for this line of assistance was based on the logic of the 
seriousness of Hurricane Michelle’s destruction, estimated at $1.8 billion, considered as 
the worst natural calamity in Cuba in fifty years. Thus the justification for the use of € 
0.5 million earmarked to provide medical and other emergency supplies for affected 
persons. As far as disaster prevention is concerned the Commission, in December 2001, 
approved funding for Cuba in the amount of € 0.92 million in the context of a regional 
program for the Caribbean. 
The EU Commission and other EU entities have been well aware of the seriousness 
of the Cuban economic situation. In addition to the damage caused by natural disasters, 
                                                             
33 See my column entitled “Cuba y la Unión Europea,” Diario16, 5 setiembre 2001. 
34 From EU Commission sources. See Appendix V. 
35 Data and considerations from EU Commission sources.  
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the Cuban government has seen a severe drop in fiscal revenues and foreign exchange 
because of consequences of the September 11 attack. Tourism decreased by 13% in 
September 2001 and 20% in October 2001, and U.S. remittances were reduced by 60%. 
On top of that Russia’s decision to close its Cuban ‘spy station’ represented an annual 
loss of some $200 million. In this rather dark setting, Cuba had to look for its natural 
geographical habitat. In consequence, the EU Commission has been clearly in favor of 
promoting the regional integration of Cuba in the Caribbean, Latin American and ACP 
context. In this connection the opportunities that the follow-up to the I EU-Latin 
America-Caribbean Summit held in Rio in 1999 provided in terms of support measures 
and partnerships, were to be fully exploited. The Commission has been also willing to 
facilitate Cuba's participation in regional measures under the auspices of CARIFORUM 
(of which Cuba has been a member since October 2001) through relevant budget lines. 
For example, a financial proposal under the 2002 budget was set foreseeing Cuba’s 
participation in a regional Caribbean project to fight swine fever. 
 
A more complex pending issue has been presented by the consequences of the 
impasse regarding the application for the Cotonou agreement. Following the 9
th 
Evaluation of the Common Position the Council concluded on June 25, 2001, that the 
EU would welcome a constructive dialogue with Cuba on a future cooperation 
framework based on the respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of 
law. This conclusion was reiterated by the Council in its 10
th Evaluation of the Common 
Position issued on December 10, 2001.
36 It was doubly ratified in June and December of 
2002, with the 11
th and 12
th evaluations.
37 This EU procedure was explicitly rejected by 
Cuba.
38 The Council deliberately chose this formulation as an implicit reference to 
Cotonou since the same text is contained in Art. 9 of the Agreement. As we will see 
later on, Cuba did not submit any other request for membership, even though Castro 
announced his intention to do so on December 12, 2002.  
 
On a more politically-oriented level, during the EU Spanish presidency of the first 
semester of 2002, relations with Cuba reflected a freezing of the attempts made during 
the previous Belgian presidency. The end balance was mixed. What was perceived by 
Cuba as a “window of opportunity” (the presidencies of Spain, Denmark and Greece 
would not make Cuba-EU relations a priority in the sense expected by Havana) did not 
materialize beyond the trip taken by Belgian Foreign Minister Jean Louis Michel to 
Cuba in August of 2001, or the low-level troika trip of December 2001.
39 
 
Meanwhile, the weight of Cuba’s international activity and concerns seemed to have 
tilted towards the Western Hemisphere, away from Europe, perceived as concentrating 
on more pressing issues such as enlargement, the rise of the right, and immigration on 
top of the crucial disagreements over the U.S. intervention in Iraq. This thesis was 
confirmed by the absence of Castro in the II EU-Latin American-Caribbean Summit 
held in Madrid on May 17-18, 2002, replicating his decision of not attending the Ibero-
American Summits held in Lima in 2001 and in the Dominican Republic in 2002, a 
yearly event where the Cuban leader has been the frequent main protagonist of 
                                                             
36See Appendix II. 
37 See Appendixes III and IV. AFP, “UE vuelve a pedir transición democrática y libertades en Cuba,” 10 
diciembre 2002. 
38 AFP, “Desdeña La Habana las posiciones de la Unión Europea,” 14 diciembre 2002. 
39 Mauricio Vicent, “La UE cree insuficiente,” El País, 9 diciembre 2001.  
 
 
12
polemics.
40 Among the reasons behind his decision was his calculation of not reaping 
the expected benefits and risking a losing confrontation with some vocal counterparts, 
and most especially Spain’s Prime Minister José María Aznar.  
 
It always remained to be seen if an (very unlikely) activation of Title III of Helms-
Burton would cause a European reaction that would endanger the future of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) besieged by a politically-loaded litigation, the main reason 
for the crafting of the 1997 and 1998 understandings between the EU Commission and 
the Clinton administration. This deal was signed between the United States and the 
European Union, by which the EU agreed to monitor future European investments in 
illegally expropriated U.S. properties in Cuba. In turn, the United States would freeze 
retaliatory measures against European investors, notably titles III and IV of the Helms-
Burton law.
41 But all of this reasonable logic seems to belong to the pre-September 11 
world scene. 
 
All things considered, in the event that the U.S.-Cuba relationship continues to 
follow the impasse of four decades while the inexorable biological transition proceeds 
in Havana, it was expected that the European attitude would not drastically change. The 
EU as an entity would continue to act in a fashion of conditioning a bilateral agreement 
to a minimum of progress in the political field, while the Common Position would be 
reduced to an endorsement of this policy. In fact, in the aftermath of Carter’s visit to 
Cuba, this attitude was confirmed by EU Commissioner Chris Patten. In the context of 
the II EU-Latin American Summit, he qualified Cuba’s respect for human rights as 
lacking.
42  The bulk of the available assistance was supposed to be dedicated to a 
minimum of anchoring Cuba in the market economy.
43 In contrast, Castro invested his 
political capital in courting his neighbors in the setting of CARICOM’s summit held in 
Havana in December 2002, where Cuba would receive encouragement for a deeper 
relationship with the ACP group, an offer that the Cuban leader took upon himself with 
renewed energy.
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
  
40 Peru Egurbide, “Fidel Castro pide visado,” El País, 15 mayo 2002; Pablo Alfonso, “Castro decide no 
asistir,” El Nuevo Herald, 17 mayo 2002. 
41See Roy, Cuba, the United States, and the Helms-Burton Doctrine, chapter 7. 
42 “EU would help Cuba more if it saw Better Respect for Human Rights,” Sources Say (Brussels), May 
16, 2002. 
43 Confirmed in a meeting between EU Commissioner Poul Nielson and Cuban Vice Minister for Foreign 
Investment and Economic Cooperation, Rodrigo Malmierca (Agence France Press, “Europa ayudará a la 
economía de mercado,” El Nuevo Herald, 5 marzo 2002, 17A). 
44 AFP, “ACP pide a UE estudiar ‘sin condición previa’ candidatura de Cuba a acuerdo de cooperación,” 
11 diciembre 2002; EFE, “Apoyan ingreso de Cuba a pacto de Cotonú,” El Nuevo Herald, 10 diciembre 
2002; Pablo Alfonso, “La diplomacia de La Habana hacia el Caribe anglófono,” El Nuevo Herald, 8 
diciembre 2002. 
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Before the Storm 
  
The year 2002 ended with two important developments on EU-Cuba relations. On the 
one hand, on December 8 Fidel Castro surprisingly announced that Cuba would reapply 
for accession to the Cotonou agreement.
45 On the other, the European Commission 
made official the opening of a full Delegation in Havana. Inaugurated in March 2003 by 
EU Commissioner Poul Nielson (who is in charge of development and ACP affairs), it 
was entrusted to an experienced staff led by former Cuba desk chief in Brussels, Sven 
Von Burgsdorff, with direct knowledge of Cuba, under the expectation of positive, 
substantial developments.
46 The background to these twin details is a combination of 
interlaced developments involving more than the two basic actors.  
 
As outlined above, after a six-year period of frosty relations presided by the 
Common Position of 1996, the Belgian presidency led the first modest troika approach 
in December 2001. However, the Spanish presidency during the first semester of 2002 
did not take any initiative to further the dialogue with Havana (in spite of a wide 
consensus recommending consultations). The Danish presidency during the second part 
of 2002 decided to insert the dialogue with Cuba in a wider EU-Latin America setting. 
While several Member States expressed renewed interest in furthering bilateral 
commercial relations, a majority in both the Council and the European Parliament 
consider the Common Position as a limiting factor that conditions the potential use of 
available instruments in the fields of political, economic and development cooperation 
on progress in respecting civil and political rights in Cuba. 
 
As a first move from the ACP Group, a request was made on September 26, 2002, to 
grant Cuba observer status for the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiation 
process. Although the Member States were divided, a clear majority was in favor of the 
request advocating Cuba’s regional political and economic integration. On November 4, 
2002, the EU troika met with Cuba in Copenhagen, with the Commission represented 
by Poul Nielson. Both parties were frank, but not aggressive in their positions. 
Disagreement continued over the EU Common Position, the human rights situation in 
Cuba and cooperation in the area of human rights, while Cuba committed to pursue 
reforms to establish a more market-oriented economy. Cuba then hinted on probable 
candidature for membership in the Cotonou Agreement, a thought that was strongly 
encouraged by the Commission. Cuba then agreed to the Commission proposal to set up 
an EU-Cuba task force to identify solutions in the field of investment and trade. As a 
result of behind the scenes negotiations, a potential compromise solution suggested by 
the Commission and supported by the Member States was contemplated in which Cuba 
would be given an “informal” observer status during the “all-ACP” phase of the 
Economic Partnership negotiations.
47    
 
Following the XII Evaluation of the EU Common Position all Member States, for 
the first time, were willing to reconsider the instruments available, with a view to 
making them more effective in the pursuit of the objectives of the Common Position. 
Following a Commission proposal the Council adopted on December 10, 2002, the 
                                                             
45 AP, “Cuba to renew request to join aid pact,” The Miami Herald, December 9, 2002. 
46 AFP, “La Comisión Europea favorece a la isla,” El Nuevo Herald, 7 marzo 2003; Bosco Esteruelas, 
“La Comisión Europea abre la colaboración con Cuba,” El País, 7 marzo 2003; Enrique Serbeto, “Castro 
podría abrir la puerta de salida a los cubanos a cambio de la ayuda de la UE”, El País, 3 marzo 2003. 
47 From EU Commission and Council sources.  
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Conclusions reconfirming the Common Position. However, they two important 
modifications were introduced:  (1) On the one hand, there were no longer limitations 
on development cooperation measures as long as the Cuban government attempted to 
meet the objectives of the Common Position (respect of human rights and democracy, 
improvement of living standards of the Cuban population and promotion of sustainable 
economic growth);  (2) On the other, the term for periodic reviews of the Common 
Position was extended from six to twelve months, with the intention of giving both 
parties a longer term for pursuing a political dialogue.
48  
 
Almost simultaneously, Castro announced in Havana before a meeting of all 
CARICOM Heads of Government (celebration of the 30
th Anniversary of the opening of 
diplomatic relations between Cuba and four Caribbean states, in frontal challenge of the 
U.S. embargo) that Cuba intended to join the Cotonou Agreement. However, two 
fundamental questions then were: How the EU would react to this? What were the 
Cuban expectations and real intentions?   
 
Cuba, understandably, would like to receive an answer before it submits its 
application. The problem is that the EU will not reveal its decisions a priori (in the ACP 
context or in any other membership procedure). For months, after much give and take, 
EU Commission officers were successful in convincing their Cuban counterparts that 
the European Union history is full of examples of a cycle including applying, rejection, 
resubmitting application, and admission. The United Kingdom and Spain are among the 
countries that experienced such process, and Cuba would not be different.
49 It must be 
understood that it is not EU policy to take an official position on a matter such as the 
admission of a new member to Cotonou unless the interested third party has formally 
introduced a membership request. The EU will therefore not be in a position to 
pronounce itself on Cuba’s eventual membership in Cotonou before being in possession 
of the Cuban request. In consequence, if Cuba were in the future to approach the ACP-
EU Council of Ministers with a new request for accession to Cotonou then the 
competent EU institutional bodies would have to assess the matter on the basis of the 
relevant part of the Cotonou Agreement (Art. 94) as any other third party request. 
 
However, Cuba, if accepted by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers as a new member 
and subject to the conclusion of the ratification process in the Member States, would not 
automatically be in a position to enjoy the financial benefits under the Agreement. This 
is stipulated in Art. 94, dictating in consequence that Cuba’s eventual accession would 
not infringe on the benefits enjoyed by the ACP States signatory to this Agreement 
under the provisions on development cooperation. Since the allocations for the 77 ACP 
Cotonou members have already been distributed on an indicative basis, Cuba would not 
receive funds under the present 9
th European Development Fund (EDF). It would be 
feasible that the EU could decide to add a specific budget line, as was the case with 
South Africa, in order to finance cooperation measures benefiting Cuba under this 
Agreement. It is equally important to recall in this connection that Cuba, once a 
member, would have to meet the essential elements of the Cotonou acquis (as in the 
case of EU membership) in order to enjoy the eventual financial and commercial 
benefits deriving from the Agreement.  
                                                             
48 General Affairs Council. XII Evaluation of the Common Position on Cuba. Conclusions. December 12, 
2002. Appendix IV. 
49 From EU sources. 
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An intriguing subject related to this complex membership procedure is the attitude 
of some individual member states. It is a fact, never confirmed in public, that some EU 
Member States continued to object to Cuba's accession to Cotonou at that stage because, 
in their judgment, Cuba had not made progress in human rights improvements. EU 
officials are careful to point out that Art. 94 sets out the formal requirements for 
membership to Cotonou. Eligible is any "independent State whose structural 
characteristics and economic and social situation are comparable to those in the ACP 
States." It is interesting to note that no other conditions are mentioned. If Cuba ever 
submits a request for accession this petition will be assessed on no other grounds than 
the ones contained in the Cotonou Agreement.  
 
However, the question if and to what extent Cuba meets the democracy and human 
rights criterion, as defined in Art. 9, is to be discussed only once Cuba is a member of 
the Agreement. The award of financial and commercial benefits under the Agreement is 
subject to fully respecting the stipulations of Art. 9. This, however, is not an issue while 
Cuba is not a Cotonou member state. It has to be understood that while the Common 
Position is a unilateral foreign policy statement of the EU, Cotonou is a multilateral 
partnership agreement constituting mutual rights and obligations under international 
law. This is separate from the annual UN Geneva evaluation of human rights, although 
it would be inconsistent if the EU Member States and candidates vote solidly to censure 
Cuba, and approve Cuba’s credentials for Cotonou. However, it has to be recalled that 
the EU has consistently supported motions in the UN criticizing the human rights 
situation in countries with cooperation agreements, including Lomé and Cotonou 
signatories.   
 
The decision to reapply for membership in 2002 and its consequences need to be 
considered in a wider and more complex scenario before the crisis of 2003, according to 
the analysis developed in Brussels. First, there was the financial exhaustion of Cuba by 
an accumulation of external shocks in 2001 (Hurricane Michelle, September 11 attacks, 
closing the Russian military intelligence station, global economic slowdown, oil price 
increases), with the result that Cuba faced in 2002 a sensible shortage in foreign hard 
currency, estimated at around $500 million. As a remedy, the Cuban government made 
special efforts to attract more tourism and foreign direct investment as well as to agree 
with debtors on rescheduling arrangements. However, some estimates question the 
internal benefits of these revenues, since as high as 40% are dedicated to import foreign 
products to be consumed by tourists.
50   
 
  On the home front, measures to further liberalize the domestic economic 
environment, especially for the local entrepreneurial sector, have however not been 
improved accordingly. The economic gap between Cubans who have access to U.S. 
dollars and those who do not is increasing, as well as internal political dissidence. The 
crime rate has been obviously on the rise in recent years but tight police and law and 
order control have clearly succeeded in reducing its more visible effects. Police forces 
have harassed political dissidents (especially the organizers of the Varela project) and 
independent journalists, leading to the drastic measures taken in March and April of 
2003.
51 
 
                                                             
50 From EU sources. 
51 From EU Commission sources.  
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On the international front Cuba embarked, after striking a rather conciliatory tone 
with the United States following the September 11 attacks, on a double-edged strategy: 
pursuing a more confrontational course with the Bush Administration and engaging in a 
deliberate offensive towards the growing U.S. anti-embargo lobby both in Congress and 
in the business community. Following Cuba’s narrow condemnation at the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2002, which was supported by several Latin 
American countries, including for the first time Mexico (with the taping of 
conversations held with President Fox), relations with the neighbors became rather sour 
(with insulting remarks against Uruguay’s president). Relations with the Caribbean have 
been less problematic, with Cuba having signed partial free trade protocols with 
CARICOM in June 2001 and having joined CARIFORUM  (the EU-ACP aid 
framework in the Caribbean area) in October 2001.  
 
Because of the endemic economic crisis in Cuba the regime was in 2002 interested 
in improving its relations with the EU. In spite of the Geneva confrontation and 
rejection of the conditions of the EU Common Position, a positive attitude towards 
Brussels developed. Allowing Osvaldo Payá to travel to Europe to receive the Sakharov 
Prize was apparently part of the strategy. In the context of this mild EU-Cuba 
“honeymoon,” the Commission was accurately perceived by Cuba as a major, cohesive 
force for a deeper rapprochement. However, Brussels was well aware that Havana’s 
moves were dictated by a long-term strategic interest. Castro did not expect any special 
softening of the official U.S. attitude after the Republican victory in the mid-term 
elections in the Fall of 2002. Hence, he needed the Europeans for breathing space, 
pressed by financial shortfalls in Cuba and the rest of Latin America. The squeeze on oil 
from Venezuela has been only one of the troubles. Moreover, the economic opening 
from the United States in allowing the exports of some items has not come without a 
price --food and medicine sales are costly since they have to be purchased on a cash 
basis. 
 
In consequence, the EU Commission opted once again for a policy of “constructive 
engagement”, as opposed to one based on coercion, hoping for preparing the 
foundations for change in the longer run. In this line of thought, the opening of the EU 
Delegation in Havana was supposed to serve as the proper setting for the inclusion of 
Cuba in the new Asia-Latin American (ALA) Regulation (in which Cuba wass already 
inserted in its 1992 arrangement), including a technical framework agreement governing 
the implementation of EU aid. This new instrument would allow for substantially wider 
development assistance objectives than under the Common Position, although this 
measure remains the EU policy towards Cuba. The Council Conclusions of December 
10, 2002, significantly widened the scope of EU development cooperation in Cuba, thus 
taking away the sector limitations imposed in 1996.  
 
The new ALA Regulation establishes clear principles for programming through a 
Country Strategy Paper and multi-annual indicative program, and limits the role of 
Member States at the project approval stage and allows untying of aid at the regional 
level. It has to be noted that, in spite of the absence of a standard cooperation agreement 
and the lack of membership in the Cotonou structure, Cuba participates to some extent 
in several EU programs: INCO (the network of research institutes), ALFA (the network 
of universities), URB AL (the network of cities), and AL INVEST (the promotion of 
investments). Cuban partners can also apply to @LIS, a program of cooperation in the  
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development of information and communication technologies in Latin American 
countries.
52  
 
On balance, there was still a sense of moderate frustration, combined with some 
resignation, as a common denominator of the European attitude. This perception would 
survive provided the Cuban internal situation would not worsen beyond the tolerable 
limits of international impact. However, in the event that during the path to a definite 
transition the European policy of economic engagement renders the expected results, a 
sense of satisfaction would then become visible. Meanwhile, each one of the member 
states will continue to proceed in the defense of their best interests and historical 
obligations. Frustration will diminish as long as the emphasis is put on lessening the 
tensions in preparing the way for a peaceful transition, under the assumption that the 
future of Cuba is, after all, in the hands of the Cubans. A Declaration of the EU Spanish 
presidency welcoming the “Varela Project,” was explicit in this line of thought widely 
shared by a majority of the decision-making and opinion circles of the EU: [The project] 
“will succeed in opening a debate in favor of the process of a peaceful transition 
towards a pluralist democracy and reconciled Cuban society.”
53 The European 
Parliament’s award of the Sakharov Prize to Oswaldo Payá,
54 the renewed offer of 
constructive engagement, and the opening of an EU Delegation in Havana were 
confirmation of this line of thought and policy. However, the serious events of April 
2003 drastically changed the constructive EU approach. 
 
 
The (Other) Empire Strikes Back 
 
Right after the serious events EU observers and representatives of member states 
compiled a bleak picture submitted in reports to the different institutions for their 
subsequent actions. It included, among others, the following aspects: 
 
•  Since March, in 29 trials, 75 defendants were found guilty and convicted under 
law articles 88 and 91 of the penal code, three others were charged under lesser 
charges. All those arrested were found guilty.  
•  Sentences ranged from 6 to 28 years with the average being 15-20 years; a total 
of 1454 years.  
•  The conduct of the trials has raised serious concerns about access to justice and 
the right to a free and fair trial by an impartial tribunal. The trials fell well short 
of international standards particularly with regard to: Adequate time and 
                                                             
52 European Commission, Cuba and the European Union, 2003. 
53 Declaration by the EU regarding the “Varela Project” (May 20, 2002). 
54 For a selection of impact of the ceremony in the Miami press, see: EFE, “Aznar pedirá a Cuba que 
permita a Payá recoger el premio Sajarov,” Diario las Américas, 3 diciembre 2002; AP, “Cuban Dissident 
Cleared to Leave to Accept Award,” The Miami Herald, December 15, 2002; Rui Ferreira, “El viaje de 
Payá causa entusiasmo y temores,” El Nuevo Herald, 17 diciembre 2002; Nancy San Martín, “Castro 
Foe’s Human Rights Award puts World Spotlight on Cuba,” The Miami Herald, December 17, 2002; 
Constant Brand, “EU Honors Cuban Dissident, Back Fight for Democracy,” The Miami Herald, 18 
diciembre 2002; Editorial, “Payá’s Freedom Prize,” The Miami Herald, December 18, 2002; EFE, “Payá: 
existe un doble embargo en Cuba,” Diario las Américas, 18 diciembre 2002; AFP, “Payá pide solidaridad 
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facilities for the preparation of a defense and communication with the counsel of 
defendant's choosing; fair public hearing by independent and impartial tribunal; 
summary group trials each lasted on average one day; defendants were tried in 
groups of approximately six, each on different charges; no independent 
international observers were allowed in the courtrooms; State Security filled the 
courtrooms and some family members/supporters were turned away. 
•  EU ambassadors were denied access to the trials.  
•  On April 11, three people responsible for kidnapping a boat were executed, 
ending a nearly 3-year moratorium on the application of the death penalty.
55 
 
With this background, on the eve of the May 1 celebration, as important in Cuba as 
it is in most of the world with the exception of the United States, the European 
Commission, in its weekly meeting, considered the thorny topic of Cuba and decided to 
file the still pending petition of Cuba to become a member of the Cotonou Agreement. 
The Commission issued a statement indicating that the situation in Cuba “has strongly 
deteriorated in such a very serious manner that the Commission did not want to remain 
silent.”
56 Commissioner Poul Nielson recommended delaying the process some months 
waiting for a change to be made by the Cuban government. Other members of the 
Commission (led by Spain’s Loyola de Palacio and UK’s Chris Patten, in charge of 
external relations) pressed for an indefinite ban on membership. Nielsen declared that 
the reason for this drastic decision was that the cooperative agreement is not limited to 
commercial benefits, but it also includes the area of respect for human rights.
57 
Moreover, Patten put the burden on Cuban authorities (“the ball is in their court”) until 
they “repair the damage done to the most basic human rights.” The Commission also 
contemplated the renewal of Cuba’s membership in the UN Human Rights 
Commission.
58 For its part, the EU Council acted with a speedy condemnation, warning 
Cuba not to expect European aid.
59 The Latin American Group of the Council decided 
to endorse an unsuccessful Nicaraguan censure motion against Cuba presented at the 
Organization of American States (OAS), to issue instructions to governments to limit 
contacts and participation in programs to be held in Havana, and to carry out a special 
evaluation of the Common Position on Cuba in place since 1996. 
 
These moves were the coordinated results of decisions made by the other EU 
institutions. When the first arrests were announced, the Greek Presidency of the EU 
issued a critical declaration.
60 On April 10, the European Parliament approved a 
Resolution expressing concern, criticizing the lack of due process, demanding the 
release of the detainees, calling Cuba to stop “hampering human rights,” and asking the 
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Council to “display firm resolve in tackling the issue of human rights in Cuba, and to 
monitor the situation very closely.” 
61  
 
For its part, the EU Council acted with a speedy condemnation, warning Cuba not to 
expect European aid.
62 The Latin American Group of the Council decided to endorse an 
unsuccessful Nicaraguan censure motion against Cuba presented at the Organization of 
American States (OAS), to issue instructions to governments to limit contacts and 
participation in programs to be held in Havana, and to carry out a special evaluation of 
the Common Position on Cuba in place since 1996.  
 
These decisions were the expected official result of a series of European reactions, 
first to the imprisonment of dissidents and later to the summary executions implemented 
by the Cuban government. 
 
Right after the announcement of the imprisonment of 76 dissidents, their 
organizations, led by leaders such as Elizardo Sánchez, Gustavo Arcos and Osvaldo 
Payá, opted for asking the help of the EU institutions in their release.
63 European 
newspapers stepped up critical commentaries against the Cuban government, while 
intellectuals signed declarations of condemnation on both sides of the Atlantic.
64 Press 
activity became spectacular most especially in Spain, and it was not limited to the 
conservative press, a trend that has been evident since the mid 90s.
65 Moreover, op-ed 
pages in newspapers of all sorts of political inclinations have become frequent 
showcases of commentaries by Cuban anti-Castro exiles.
66 Some notable desertions in 
the backing of the Cuban government as with the case of Portuguese Nobel winner 
writer, Jose Saramago,
67 reminded observers of the spectacular alarm created by the 
Heberto Padilla “confession” in 1971.
68  The scandalous reaction reached an 
unprecedented level when the executions were announced.
69 In Spain, the alarm was 
translated as censure in press reports, editorials, and columns published by leading 
opinion makers of all sorts of political inclinations.
70 PSOE leaders qualified the 
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executions as “savage”, while Izquierda Unida branded them as a “political mistake of 
great magnitude.”
71 Former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González used harsh 
qualifiers on live TV interviews referring to Castro “in the last stages of a decrepit 
regime. Former Socialist leaders and prestigious diplomats with social democratic 
credentials were especially critical of the Cuban leadership.
72  
 
The Spanish government and the leadership of the Partido Popular were especially 
noted for their blistering remarks.
73 Prime Minister Aznar, while invited to the White 
House, met in Washington, D.C., with Cuban-American members of Congress and 
issued a condemnation of the Cuban regime.
74 The PP also used the occasion to create 
confrontation with the opposition,
75 reviving the insertion of the Cuban issue as an 
internal theme to be manipulated for electoral purposes.
76 The Hispano-Cuban 
Foundation awarded its International Prizes for Human Rights to three distinguished 
Cuban dissidents in a ceremony to be held at the Spanish government setting of Casa 
América.
77 The Spanish Senate passed a motion to “withdraw” a medal given to Fidel 
Castro in 1987 on the occasion of a visit by its President.
78 A former President and 
current PSOE spokesman in the Senate lamented the lack of Spanish consensus on Cuba 
and potential loss of Spain’s influence in the Cuban transition.
79 The who-is-who of 
Spanish artists signed protest manifestos along worldwide figures,
80 with the result that 
only Colombian novelist Gabriel García Márquez remained isolated in the group of 
famous writers siding with Castro.
81 In spite of the internal controversies, a survey 
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revealed that an overwhelming majority of 90% of Spaniards believe that Castro should 
leave power, while 78% condemns the executions, figures similar to the popular 
opposition to the war in Iraq and to the U.S. embargo against Cuba.
82 
 
 
David Responds to the New Goliath 
 
Cuban authorities replied to this criticism and opposition by using hard expressions such 
as “blackmail” and “soft” [on the United States] for the actions and attitudes of 
Europeans.
83 The Cuban ambassador in Madrid branded Spanish politicians as 
“opportunists” seeking electoral gains.
84 Meanwhile, protests in Europe and Latin 
America degenerated in serious confrontations and aggressions inflicted on press 
members by Cuban diplomatic staff.
85 The EU Commission warned that the repressive 
measures could have a “devastating effect” on the relations with the EU.
86 Several 
European countries cancelled or considerably downsized the level of scheduled 
participation in programs and activities to be held in Cuba.
87 The French government, in 
spite of its spat with the United States over the war in Iraq, issued extremely critical 
statements against Castro, vouching for support of EU-wide measures,
88 while 
intellectuals signed letters of protest.
89 The Italian parliament and government, 
dominated by premier Berlusconi’s party, announced their intention of proposing what 
they envisioned as a European-wide embargo on Cuba, in anticipation of tougher 
measures to be implemented when holding the EU presidency in the second semester of 
2003, while reducing the diplomatic relations between the two countries to the level 
maintained with Pinochet’s Chile from 1973 to 1990.
90  
 
Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque responded to the EU’s criticism in a 
three-hour press conference held on April 9, transmitted on Cuban television. He 
lamented that the EU was not making similar condemning statements on the situation on 
the imprisonment and trial of the Cuban security agents arrested in Miami. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs also claimed that the EU has never condemned the United States for 
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a much higher annual number of executions. Pérez Roque also stated that recent 
sentencing of dissidents as well as executions were performed strictly according to 
Cuban law and were “a sad but absolute necessity for defending the vital right to 
national independence and sovereignty,” as the United States “is looking for a pretext 
for an armed intervention” in the island, by “creating the conditions for a new massive 
exodus from Cuba,” are some arguments consistently reflected in other official 
declarations and reflections in the Cuban media. Most of these arguments were 
reiterated by the address made by Fidel Castro on May 1, and reflected by Cuba’s 
former ambassador to the EU, Carlos Alzugaray.
91     
 
On Friday May 16, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba summoned the newly-
appointed charge-d’affairs of the European Commission in Havana and announced the 
withdrawal of Cuba’s application procedure for membership in the Cotonou Agreement of 
the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, and in fact renouncing to benefit from 
European development aid.
92 In a blistering note published in Granma, the official 
newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, the government blamed the EU Commission 
for exerting undue pressure, alleged its alignment with the policies of the United States, 
and rejected the EU’s censure for the measures taken by Cuba during the previous weeks.
93 
In reality, Cuba avoided an embarrassing flat rejection of its application. This was the anti-
climatic ending for a long process that can be traced back to the end of the Cold War, in a 
context where Cuba has been testing alternative grounds to substitute for the 
overwhelming protection of the Soviet Union.  
 
In the expectation of a lasting impasse and Cuba’s rejection of positive moves, in 
addition to not attending Cuba’s May 1
st celebrations, EU member state embassies in 
Cuba were to be invited to establish a new report on the situation of Human Rights in 
Cuba for an evaluation by the Council.
94 On June 5, the EU Greek Presidency issued a 
harsh Declaration, labeling as “deplorable” the recent Cuban actions, “aiming not only 
at violating fundamental freedom, but also at depriving civilians of the ultimate human 
right, that of life.” In consequence, the EU called Cuban authorities “to release 
immediately all political prisoners,” and decided the following collective measures: 
 
•  limit bilateral high-level government visits 
•  reduce the profile of  member states’ participation in cultural events 
•  proceed with the reevaluation of the EU Common Position
95     
•  invite Cuban dissidents to national celebrations
96 
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In fact, this policy was dramatically inaugurated when on July 14 the French embassy 
invited Cuban dissidents to the reception for the anniversary of the French Revolution. 
The Cuban government responded with a non-attendance policy and the celebration of a 
parallel function to celebrate its admiration for the 1789 event. 
 
Cuba’s Foreign Minister Pérez Roque qualified these EU measures as a result of a 
“superficial analysis” of Cuba, a “victim of an agreement between the United States and 
the EU,” showing “European incapacity for maintaining an autonomous policy.”
97 He 
also refused to receive the members of the EU Troika (Italy, Greece and Denmark), 
while Cuban officials skipped attending receptions at EU member states diplomatic 
functions. In an adaptation of a common epithet bestowed on Cuban exiles in Miami, 
Fidel Castro indirectly referred to the EU as a “little gang” and “a mafia allied with 
fascist imperialists.”
98  U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, received the latest EU 
measures with satisfaction indicating that the United States might join the European 
Union in a common strategy towards Cuba.
99   
 
This apparent U.S. invitation for a coalition added fuel to the ongoing fire. The 
Cuban government increased the level of the confrontation with the EU to an 
unprecedented level.
100 Fidel Castro and Foreign Minister Pérez Roque targeted Italy 
and, most especially, Spain as the leaders of the EU measures imposed on Cuba.
101 The 
Italian government announced the termination of development programs estimated at 
about $40 million, then rejected Cuban personal insults against Premier Silvio 
Berlusconi (addressed as “Nero,” and “Benito Berlusconi”), and subsequently 
congressional sources demanded the withdrawal of the ambassador.
102 France 
announced the termination of some cooperation programs, while former Socialist Prime 
Minister Laurent Fabius questioned what he considered as a cautious attitude on behalf 
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of the French government towards Cuba.
103 The Spanish government initially exercised 
extreme restraint
104 when challenged by a government-led demonstration in front of the 
Spanish embassy, presided over by Castro himself. Spain’s Premier José María Aznar, 
accused as the main author of the “treacherous escalation against Cuba,” was labeled by 
Castro on live television as a “caballerito”, “coward”, “fascist”, and a “little Fuhrer”, 
depicted in posters as wearing a Hitler-looking moustache and a swastika. While the 
Spanish press reiterated critical commentaries on the Cuban reactions, former Spanish 
Prime Minister Felipe González branded Castro’s actions as “pathetic,” expressing 
doubts about the internal security of Cuba in view of the rash of aircraft and boat 
hijackings.
105  
 
Then, accusing Spain of improperly using its facilities, the Cuban government 
announced the cancellation of the bi-national agreement for the Spanish Cultural Center, 
a unique institution funded by Madrid since 1997 at an initial cost of over $3 million for 
the remodeling of a beautiful and centrally-located building in front of the Malecón 
waterfront.
106 In an effort to divide the EU and Spanish leadership, the Cuban 
government indicated that the alleged Spanish and Italian influence on European 
decisions dictated its measures. With kind references to King Juan Carlos (in contrast to 
the attitude toward President Aznar) and former Spanish anticommunist dictator 
Francisco Franco (who never broke diplomatic relations with Cuba), Castro reiterated 
his personal inclinations. Ironically, commentators insisted on the similarities between 
the current Cuban situation and the last stages of the Franco regime.
107 Behind the 
scenes, Cuban officials confidentially expressed concern about the international 
isolation of the regime and the erratic and counterproductive result of the actions and 
declarations implemented and issued by the top leadership, hoping that calm would 
finally prevail, reconstructing basic relations with the EU, a thought that is shared by the 
EU leadership.
108 Cubans attributed the ability to deal with different languages to their 
easiness to make friends and enemies alike.
109                                           
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The EU Foreign Affairs Council rejected as “unacceptable” the insults from Havana, 
confirming the sanctions. Italy pressed for the termination of cooperation funding still 
enjoyed by Cuba,
110 but Javier Solana, the High Representative for Foreign Policy of 
the EU did not endorse the ending of humanitarian aid.
111 While the Spanish 
government reaction was prudent, vowing not to engage in a “verbal spiral of mutual 
disqualifications,” the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Cuba’s 
ambassador to Madrid, Isabel Allende, to give her its displeasure for the general 
situation, the threats on the Cultural Center, and the presence of Castro in the lead of the 
demonstrations, an activity considered “outside the margins of normal diplomatic 
usage.”
112 Allende, in turn, blamed Spain for the diplomatic conflict.
113  
 
In an exchange of declarations and opinions issued by Cuban and Spanish officials, 
the already cloudier context of relations between the two countries got even more 
confusing if not contradictory. On the one hand, Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Ana Palacio, in a symposium organized by the Partido Popular- controlled FAES 
foundation, publicly stated that the Cuban regime was “exhausted” and “will not survive 
its founder”, because of its “caullista” character. Moreover, she noted that “the Cuban 
transition has already started”, and that “the Cuban Suárez [as a parallel to the Spanish 
political process) is already present in the island”.
114 Coincidentally, the Spanish press 
frequently mentions Oswaldo Payá as the “Cuban Suárez”.
115 In addition, while 
business delegations decided to postpone scheduled visits to Cuba waiting for a better 
climate, reports emanating from the governing Partido Popular signaled the intention of 
the Prime Minister of convening the Spanish companies dealing with tourism in Cuba to 
recommend them “not to benefit the Castro regime”.
116 On the other hand, in contrast to 
the acrimony of official relations between Havana and Madrid, Cuban Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Pérez Roque assured over one hundred Spanish and Italian companies 
that they would not be affected, reducing the conflict to a personal feud.
117            
 
In an apparent cohesive policy of avoiding further controversies, the Spanish 
government elected a wait-and-see attitude expecting the Cuban government to make 
the next move regarding its announced plans for the intervention of the Cultural Center. 
While legally speaking the Castro government could use the contractual clauses to 
denounce the agreement with a ninety-day notice, the Spanish government could litigate 
on the grounds of expenses incurred in the delivery of furniture and the over $3 million 
contributed for the remodeling of the building. Meanwhile, the official posture of 
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Madrid was revealed in the collective demands and expectations inserted in the EU 
General Affairs Council conclusions of July 21. In Cuba, the government was about to 
commemorate the 50
th anniversary of the attack on the Moncada barracks. 
 
As an answer to the conditioning message of assistance and the political demands 
given by the EU, Castro dramatically ended a half a century of Cuban history 
confronting the United States by electing to target a new enemy –the European Union. 
Calculating the effective EU assistance to about an average of $4.2 million in recent 
years, reduced to less than $1 million in 2002, of which no funds have arrived yet, 
Castro pointed out that Cuba has imported European goods valued at $1.5 million, while 
EU’s imports of Cuban products only amounted to $571 million. He not only blamed 
Spain’s Prime Minister Aznar for being the main instigator of the EU measures, but 
labeled Spanish education as a “banana republic disaster, a shame for Europe”. In an 
apparent deviation from his previous selective critiques and kind references to different 
EU commissioners, Castro also accused the professional staff of the EU institutions (“a 
small group of bureaucrats”) of drafting a resolution (a “cowardly and repugnant act”), 
allegedly without consulting their ministers. Claiming the EU is endorsing “the 
hostility, threats, and dangers for Cuba” of the “aggressive policy of the hegemonic 
superpower”, he stated that Cuba “does not need the European Union to survive,” and 
bowed that “neither Europe nor the United States will say the last word about the 
destiny of humanity.”
118  
 
Subsequently, the Cuban government sent a three-paragraph letter to the European 
Commission confirming the terms of Castro’s speech. The EU Commission answered 
this address by confirming the spirit and the content of the conditioning conclusions and 
declarations, lamenting the “extreme attitude of the Cuban government,” accepting its 
decision, and pledging to maintain its willingness for a political dialogue with Cuba.
119 
The Spanish government remained silent while millions of European citizens and the 
EU leadership went on vacation.                      
        
 
Conclusion 
 
The balance sheet of the experience of the European Union’s policies and attitudes on 
Cuba shows a mixed picture. It is composed of a coherent script of measures intended in 
the first place for maintaining the communication line open, and secondly for 
contributing to facilitating the conditions for a sort of “soft landing” in the terrain of 
democracy and market economy in the event of a peaceful transition. This strategy does 
not come free of charge, as demonstrated by the persistent negative vote on Cuba in the 
UN Commission for Human Rights, and the maintenance of the Common Position 
imposed in 1996 conditioning any special cooperation and aid package to the 
implementation of political reforms.  
 
                                                             
118 See speech at Santiago, July 26, 2003. For initial wire reports, see Mar Marín, EFE, “Castro responde 
a UE con renuncia a diálogo político y a ayudas,” 27 julio 2003. See text in Annex XIII, reproduced in 
Granma, 27 julio 2003. For selected reports in the Spanish press: Mauricio Vicent, ”Castro renuncia a la 
ayuda humanitaria,” El País, 28 julio 2003; Angel Tomás González, “Cuba renuncia al diálogo y la 
ayuda”, El Mundo, 28 julio 2003.    
119 Sandro Pozzi, “Cuba comunica oficialmente su renuncia a las ayudas de la UE,” El País, 2 agosto 
2003.  
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These institutional framework contrasts, on the one hand, with the apparently 
uncoordinated policies of the member states that trade and invest in Cuba according to 
their individual interests. This has made the Common Position “neither common, nor a 
policy,” in the words of sarcastic EU insiders.
120 On the other hand, the EU collective 
strategy contrasts with the U.S. policy of confrontations and harassment. While the 
United States has been pursuing a path composed of the embargo and extraterritorial 
laws such as Helms-Burton, the EU has opted for a “constructive engagement”. While 
the European pattern has been geared toward preparing for the transition, the United 
States policy has concentrated on regime change.
121 Both, however, share one 
dimension in common –Cuba has not changed or reformed according to the expected 
results. The European strategy can be labeled at its initial stages after the end of the 
Cold War as one based on good intentions and reasonable (if not high) expectations. But 
at the end of any serious attempt to condition an offer of a special status in the EU 
structure (bilateral agreement, Lomé, Cotonou), the result has been a high degree of 
frustration. With the latest development of the arrests and executions, this sentiment has 
been translated into blunt irritation.  
 
Decision-makers in Brussels and many European capitals have come to the 
conclusion that Castro’s priorities place a conditioned relationship with the European 
Union at a lower level than the urgency to maintain a line of internal discipline at the 
cost of violating basic human rights. Moreover, the confrontation with the United States 
is considered by the Cuban regime as the ultimate raison d’être to justify the 
continuation of the system and the refusal to modify it, or even less to change it. This 
ever-present theme is obsessive in all communications and declarations of the Cuban 
government when dealing in public and in private with EU officials. In view of the 
alleged “aggressive,” “subversive,” irresponsible,” and “provocative,” behavior of U.S. 
officials in Havana supporting “mercenaries, created, organized, trained and 
financed”
122 by Washington, in Brussels and in many European capitals observers 
wonder why the Cuban government does not decide to close down the U.S. Interest 
Section instead of executing reprisals against European embassies. The answer is very 
simple. Besides having a scapegoat at hand, Castro needs the United States presence in 
Havana to administer the visa programs and guarantee the reception of funds from the 
exile community.                  
 
In sum, in view of the seriousness of the events of April 2003, considering the 
unanimous condemnation and censure issued by the EU institutions, and taking into 
account the Cuban hard-line in rejecting conditions from the EU, it is expected that the 
freezing of the consideration of Cuba’s membership in the ACP network and any other 
special economic benefits will continue. As discussed above, the strategy of giving 
Cuba a longer breathing space by extending the period of evaluation of the Common 
Position from a semester to a year was scuttled in view of the Cuban blunt rejection of 
conditions, with the result of the renewal of the conditioning by the Council in June and 
July of 2003. The prospects of a harder EU attitude under the Italian presidency in the 
second part of the year were confirmed by the Declaration issued by the Presidency, the 
                                                             
120 From EU Commission and Council sources. 
121 For a review of the U.S. policy towards Cuba since the end of the Cold War, see Thomas Morley and 
Chris McGillion, Unfinished Business: America and Cuba after the Cold War, 1989-2001 (NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
122 Terms used by Cuba’s Foreign Minister Pérez Roque in a letter addressed to EU Commissioner Poul 
Nielson, May 23, 2003, in answering his letter of concern dated April 22, 2003.   
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announcement of the new diplomatic measures to be implemented, and the confirming 
conclusions of the General Affairs Council. The explicit rejection of conditions made by 
Fidel Castro on July 26 has made the prospects of a rapprochement cloudier than ever.                                 
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Appendix I 
 
COMMON POSITION 
of December 2, 1996, 
defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 
of the Treaty on the European Union on Cuba. 
 
 
OFFICIAL JOURNAL NO. L 322 , 12/12/1996 P. 1  
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,  
Having regard to the Treaty on the European Union and, in particular, Article J.2 
thereof,  
HAS DEFINED THE FOLLOWING COMMON POSITION:  
1.  The objective of the European Union in its relations with Cuba is to encourage a 
process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in the 
living standards of the Cuban people. A transition would most likely be peaceful 
if the present regime were itself to initiate or permit such a process. It is not 
European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures with 
the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people.  
2.  The European Union acknowledges the tentative economic opening undertaken 
in Cuba to date. It is its firm wish to be Cuba's partner in the progressive and 
irreversible opening of the Cuban economy. The European Union considers that 
full cooperation with Cuba will depend upon improvements in human rights and 
political freedom, as indicated by the European Council in Florence.  
3.  In order to facilitate peaceful change in Cuba, the European Union  
a.  Will intensify the present dialogue with the Cuban authorities and with all 
sectors of Cuban society in order to promote respect for human rights and real 
progress towards pluralist democracy;  
b.  Will seek out opportunities - even more actively than heretofore - to remind the 
Cuban authorities, both publicly and privately, of fundamental responsibilities 
regarding human rights, in particular freedom of speech and association;  
c.  Will encourage the reform of internal legislation concerning political and civil 
rights, including the Cuban criminal code, and, consequently, the abolition of all 
political offences, the release of all political prisoners and the ending of the 
harassment and punishment of dissidents;   
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d.  Will evaluate developments in Cuban internal and foreign policies according to 
the same standards that apply to European Union relations with other countries, 
in particular the ratification and observance of international human rights 
conventions;  
e.  Will remain willing in the meantime, through the member states, to provide ad 
hoc humanitarian aid, subject to prior agreement regarding distribution; 
currently applicable measures to ensure distribution through non-governmental 
organizations, the churches and international organizations will be maintained 
and, where appropriate, reinforced. It is noted that the Commission is proceeding 
on the same basis;  
f.  Will remain willing, through the member states, also to carry out focused 
economic cooperation actions in support of the economic opening being 
implemented. It is noted that the Commission is proceeding on the same basis.  
4.  As the Cuban authorities make progress towards democracy, the European 
Union will lend its support to that process and examine the appropriate use of 
the means at its disposal for that purpose, including:  
•  The intensification of a constructive, result-oriented political dialogue between 
the European Union and Cuba,  
•  The intensification of cooperation and, in particular, economic cooperation,  
•  The deepening of the dialogue with the Cuban authorities, through the 
appropriate instances, in order to explore further the possibilities for future 
negotiation of a Cooperation Agreement with Cuba, on the basis of the relevant 
conclusions of the European Councils in Madrid and Florence.  
5.  The implementation of this common position will be monitored by the Council. 
An evaluation of this common position will be undertaken after six months.  
 
6.  This common position shall take effect on 2 December 1996.  
 
7.  This common position shall be published in the Official Journal.  
 
Done at Brussels, 2 December 1996.  
 
For the Council 
The President 
R. QUINN  
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Appendix II 
 
 
General Affairs Council. Conclusions 
X Evaluation of the Common Position on Cuba 
December 10, 2001 
 
 
The Council took note of the tenth evaluation of the EU Common Position on Cuba 
and acknowledged the efforts made in recent months to open a constructive and frank 
dialogue on all issues of common interest, in keeping with its conclusions on the ninth 
evaluation of the Common Position last June.  
The Council reiterated that the objectives of the European Union toward Cuba 
remain the encouragement of a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, a lasting economic recovery and a rise in 
living standards for the population. 
Following a detailed examination and exchanges of information – notably during the 
recent political dialogue between the EU Troika and Cuba – the Council observes that 
the situation in that country is still seriously wanting as regards the recognition and 
application of civil and political freedoms and the refusal of the Cuban authorities to 
contemplate reforms leading to a political system based on those values.  
However, it notes that there are a few signs of movement: greater religious freedom, 
the fact that the death penalty has not been carried out for two years, a marked decrease 
in the number of political prisoners and an increase in the number of United Nations 
human rights instruments ratified. 
The Council also welcomes the decision taken by the Cuban Parliament at its sitting 
on 4 October to approve Cuba's accession to all the UN Conventions on terrorism. 
The Council therefore considers that the Common Position is still valid and remains 
the basis of the European Union’s policy toward Cuba. The Council considers it 
essential to continue the dialogue in order to produce tangible results, particularly as 
regards future cooperation based on respect for democratic principles, human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. In that context, the Council would point out 
that it expects to see meaningful indications from the Cuban Government that it is 
moving to achieve the Common Position's objectives. 
The Council points out that it is extremely important to the EU that Cuba should 
abide by the principles of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It hopes that Cuba will be able to sign these 
two Covenants at the earliest opportunity. 
In connection with Cuba's current economic difficulties, the Council underlines the 
importance of the increased economic links, trade and tourism between the EU 
countries and Cuba in helping to improve the situation in the country. Accordingly, the 
Council urges Cuba to extend and develop the economic and legal reforms it has begun. 
In that connection, the Council considers that the EU must step up cooperation in Cuba, 
in particular through civilian and non-governmental organizations.  
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Appendix III 
 
General Affairs Council. Conclusions 
XI Evaluation of the Common Position 
June 17, 2002 
 
  The Council took note of the eleventh evaluation of the European Union 
common position on Cuba. Major changes on the part of the Cuban government toward 
the accomplishment of the aims of the common position are still lacking. Therefore, the 
common position remains the basis of the European Union’s policy toward Cuba and 
the Council took note of its continued validity. However, the Council noted some 
positive signs, such as greater religious freedom, the decrease of political prisoners, the 
non application of the death penalty for two years and a half and the ratification of more 
instruments on human rights. The Council, recalling the UNCHR Resolution of 19 April 
2002, invites Cuba to sign the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at the earliest opportunity. The Council noted 
some recent signs of increased openness by the Cuban authorities but considered that 
these are only the first steps. 
  The Council reiterated that the objective of the European Union toward Cuba 
remains the encouragement of a process of transition to pluralist democracy, the respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedom, as well as an economic recovery that allows 
an improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people. The Council expects 
positive steps by the Cuban government, which will lead to real reforms toward a 
political system, based on democratic values. In this sense, the Council follows with 
interest the evolution of the Varela project, legally based on the constitution, and 
encourages the Cuban government to consider it as a legitimate initiative since it 
represents an important effort to introduce these reforms. 
  The Council reaffirms that it is essential to deepen the political dialogue resumed 
between the EU and the Cuban authorities in order to produce tangible results, 
particularly in the political, economic and civil rights spheres, with the aim of future 
cooperation based on the respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of 
law. The Council considers that the EU should reinforce its cooperation efforts in the 
country supporting meaningful economic and legal reform and the civil society. 
  Within the framework of this dialogue, the European Union will continue to 
monitor the evolution of the human rights situation and the various initiatives within the 
constitutional process in Cuba.   
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Appendix IV 
 
General Affairs Council. Conclusions 
XII Evaluation of the EU Common Position on Cuba 
December 10, 2002 
 
  The Council took note of the twelve evaluation of the European Union Common 
Position on Cuba and acknowledged the continuation of an open and constructive 
dialogue with Cuba on all issues of common interest. The Council reiterated that the 
objectives of the European Union policy toward Cuba remain the encouragement of a 
process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedom, a lasting economic recovery and an improvement in the living 
standards for the population. 
  The Council noted that since the previous evaluation last June, there have been 
no significant positive steps by the Cuban Government leading to the accomplishments 
of the aims of the Common Position. Although recognizing some positive signs in the 
field of greater religious freedom, no progress is observed in the implementation of 
reforms leading to a political system that respects civil and political freedom. All civil 
initiatives, claiming political freedom and respect for civil rights and aiming at a 
political system based on democratic values, such as the Varela project, should be 
encouraged. In addition the Council would strongly urge the Cuban Government to take 
the necessary steps to ratify the UN Covenant on Political and Civil Rights as well as on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
  The Council therefore reaffirms that the Common Position is still valid and 
remains the basis of the European Union’s policy toward Cuba. In order to promote a 
more efficient pursuit of the aims of the Common Position the Council considers that 
the political dialogue should be continued in order to promote tangible results, 
particularly in the political, economic and civil rights spheres. At the same time the 
Council encourages the strengthening of the EU development cooperation in Cuba in 
areas that promote the transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights as 
well as in areas that improve the standards of living of the Cuban population and 
promote sustainable economic growth. The Council welcomes the decision of the 
Commission to open an office in Havana as one instrument to strengthening this 
cooperation. The Council decided to evaluate the Common Position in December 2003. 
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Appendix V 
 
 
EC Cooperation with Cuba 1997-2001 (Commitments) 
 
Budget 
line 
Sector 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
B-210 
B-219 
Humanitarian aid 
Disaster prevention 
10.3 9.8  11.4 2  8.5 
0.9 
B-20  Food  security  0.2 0.2 0.7 1  0 
B-6000  NGOs Co-Financing    0.6  2.4  2.8  8.2  5.4 
B-311 Economic  cooperation  with 
LA countries 
1.1 2  2.1 5.8 4.9   
B-70 EIDHR 
(European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human 
Rights) 
0 0 0 0 0.5 
         
         
Total    12.2 14.4 17  17  20.2 
 
Source: European Commission, Cuba y la Unión Europea (2002).  
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Appendix VI 
 
European Parliament 
Resolution 
 
April 10, 2003 
 
Human rights in Cuba 
 
The European Parliament, 
–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Cuba, 
 
–  having regard to the declaration of 26 March 2003 by the Presidency on behalf of 
the European Union concerning the arrest of opposition members in Cuba, 
 
–  having regard to the common position 96/697/CFSP of 2 December 1996, defined 
by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on 
Cuba
123, and periodically renewed, 
 
–  having regard to the provisions of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement
124 
(Cotonou Agreement), 
 
A.  extremely concerned by the numerous arrests in Cuba, where over 70 human 
rights activists, members of the political opposition, intellectuals, independent 
journalists, Varela Project promoters and members of other groups supporting 
democracy in Cuba, and trade unionists have been imprisoned since 18 March 
2003,  
 
B.  whereas these arrests are essentially based on offences such as dissenting from 
official Cuban policies and exercising the right of freedom of expression, and, for 
that reason, the individuals in question are accused of subversive activity under 
Law 88 on Defending National Independence,  
 
C.  whereas the exercise of the freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, 
 
D.  whereas the trials of these citizens were summary in the extreme, and whereas the 
trials are being held without even the minimum requirements of due process, in 
the total absence of international observers and members of the diplomatic corps; 
whereas the sentences requested are extremely severe, ranging from 20 years to 
life and even the death penalty, 
 
E.  whereas various sentences have already been pronounced, including 27 years' 
imprisonment in some cases,  
 
F.  whereas the Commission, in accordance with normal procedure in such matters, is 
drawing up an evaluation report to be forwarded to the Member States with a view 
                                                             
123  OJ L 322, 12.12.1996, p. 1. 
124  OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3.  
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to taking a decision on whether to accept the Cuban Government’s request to join 
the Cotonou Agreement, 
 
G.  whereas the Commission has recently opened an office in Havana, 
 
H.  whereas in December 2002, the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize 
for freedom of expression to the Cuban dissident and opposition member Oswaldo 
Payá, 
 
1.  Strongly condemns the wave of arrests and sentences involving the Cuban 
opposition and independent press, since such repressive behaviour does not 
encourage a climate for peaceful change in the country; 
 
2.  Calls on the Cuban authorities to release those arrested immediately; 
 
3.  Believes that no law may restrict the right of freedom of expression and under no 
circumstances may it impose prison sentences on individuals exercising that 
freedom; stresses that the freedom of expression, organisation and information is 
one of the cornerstones of all democratic systems; 
 
4.  Believes that the immediate release of all those arrested and the cessation of these 
arbitrary arrests would constitute a very clear and positive signal with regard to 
the Cuban Government’s wish to engage in political dialogue with the EU and to 
bring about Cuba’s accession to the Cotonou Agreement; 
 
5.  Urges the Council and the Commission to continue their efforts to promote 
positive change in Fidel Castro’s regime on the basis of the universal principles 
concerning  respect for human rights and democratic values; 
 
6.  Calls on the Cuban authorities to stop hampering human rights and to remove all 
barriers to freedom of movement, expression, information and association and to 
party political involvement; 
 
7.  Asks the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy and its Delegation for Relations with the Countries of Central 
America to display firm resolve in tackling the issue of human rights in Cuba, and 
to monitor the situation very carefully; 
 
8.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission, 
the ACP Council of Ministers, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the 
Government and National People’s Assembly of the Republic of Cuba, and to 
Oswaldo Payá Sardiñas, winner of the European Parliament’s 2002 Sakharov 
Prize.  
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Appendix VII 
 
 
European Union 
Presidency 
April 14, 2003 
 
Declaration 
 
 
 
•  The EU condemns the large-scale arrests, unfair summary prosecution and 
arbitrary and excessive sentences of numerous dissidents for peacefully 
expressing their political, religious and social views and for exercising their right 
to full and equal participation in public affairs.  
 
•  Consequently, the EU demands that those persons, whom it considers as 
prisoners of conscience, be released without delay and calls further for the 
immediate release of all political prisoners. It is also deeply concerned about the 
continued repression of members of the opposition.  
 
•  The EU strongly condemns the recent executions conducted after summary trials 
of Cuban citizens and deplores the end of the moratorium on death penalty in the 
country.    
 
•  These latest developments, which mark a further deterioration in the human 
rights situation in the country, will affect the EU’s relationship with Cuba and 
the prospects for increased cooperation. Violations of civil and political rights 
will be monitored very closely by the EU and they will continue to influence the 
Union’s relations with Cuba." 
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Appendix VIII 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Fifty-ninth Session 
(Geneva, 17 March-25 April 2003) 
 
Geneva, April 16, 2003 
Final Draft 
 
 
GENERAL COMMENT BEFORE TAKING ACTION   
ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION 
‘HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CUBA’ (L.2) 
 
 
General comment on the draft resolution entitled “Human Rights Situation in Cuba”. 
 
The European Union wishes to stress its grave concern at the human rights situation in 
Cuba, which has significantly deteriorated during the last weeks. In this light, the EU 
would welcome a draft resolution reflecting in a stronger and more effective manner the 
recent unfortunate developments.  
 
The EU condemns the large-scale arrests, unfair summary prosecution and arbitrary and 
excessive sentences of numerous dissidents for peacefully expressing their political, 
religious and social views and for exercising their right to full and equal participation in 
public affairs.  
 
Consequently, the EU demands that those persons, whom it considers as prisoners of 
conscience, be released without delay and calls further for the immediate release of all 
political prisoners. It is also deeply concerned about the continued repression of 
members of the opposition.  
 
The EU strongly condemns the recent executions conducted after summary trials of 
Cuban citizens and deplores the end of the moratorium on death penalty in the country.  
 
These latest developments, which mark a further deterioration in the human rights 
situation in the country, will affect the EU’s relationship with Cuba and the prospects 
for increased cooperation. Violations of civil and political rights will be monitored very 
closely by the EU and they will continue to influence the Union’s relations with Cuba. 
 
We would like to reiterate that the objective of the EU in its relations with Cuba 
is to encourage a process of transition to a pluralist democracy and respect for human  
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rights and fundamental freedoms as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in 
the living standards of the Cuban people.  
 
The EU recognises the efforts of the Government of Cuba to give effect to the 
social rights of the population despite an adverse international environment.  
  
Lastly, the EU strongly urges the Government of Cuba to receive the personal 
representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and to provide all the 
facilities necessary for her to be able to fulfil the mandate contained in resolution 
2002/18.  
 
The EU will support the draft resolution L.2 [and the amendment L.74].  
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Appendix IX 
 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA 
 
 
May 17, 2003 
 
The Government of Cuba has once again found itself compelled to withdraw its request 
for accession to the Cotonou Agreement, which regulates economic and cooperation 
relations between the European Union and the 79 countries of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group (ACP).  
 
This decision is Cuba’s response to that of the European Commission, which last 30 
April announced that it was indefinitely postponing all consideration on the Cuban 
request that such Commission should submit to the Council of Ministers of the 15 
member countries of the European Union. The alleged pretext was a European 
disagreement over the just sentences imposed by Cuban Courts of Law on the 
mercenaries that were collaborating with the US Government and on the hijackers of 
Baraguá boat. In practice, such decision leaves Cuba’s request in limbo and intends to 
exert pressure on our country by setting forth unacceptable conditionalities and adopting 
an intrusive position in relation to Cuba’s internal affairs. As stated by spokesman 
Christopher Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, “as long as the situation 
doesn’t move, obviously the Commission will have no reasons to change today’s 
situation.” 
 
Cuba’s first request for admission into the Cotonou Agreement was on 10 March 2000. 
It was then responding to the friendly interest by Caribbean countries – which insisted 
that Cuba should join, in a fraternal gesture of cordiality that our country will always 
appreciate. They considered such action to be instrumental in Cuba’s integration into 
the Caribbean and conducive to improving the framework of relations with the 
European Union. Cuba was not after any access quotas for the European market or 
additional cooperation resources from the Union – meager as they are – because it was 
fully aware that its admission could not even slightly affect the legitimate interests of its 
Caribbean brothers and sisters. Cuba’s motivation to apply for admission was 
exclusively in reciprocity to the support provided by the Caribbean countries at first and 
then by the whole ACP Group. 
 
However, such application was thwarted when Cuba found itself compelled to withdraw 
it because several members of the European Union – led by the Spanish Government of 
José María Aznar and by the British Government – attempted to establish additional and 
discriminatory requirements for Cuba, while designing an inspection of our country as a 
prerequisite to our admission. 
 
On the other hand, the European Union’s applicable decision-making system, which 
requires the unanimous vote of the 15 member countries, made it easier for the handful 
of nations opposing Cuba’s admission from the outset to achieve their objective.   
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In turn, the countries that make up the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP), led 
by the Caribbean nations, have unflinchingly supported our country – and in a really 
exceptional act, they even decided to change Cuba into a full member of the ACP 
Group, although it was not a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement. Cuba will never 
forget that at every international forum Caribbean countries have spoken out against the 
blockade and the anti-Cuban aggressions and in favor of our right to independence.  
 
For all of these reasons – and also taking into consideration that various European 
countries expressed their support for us, urging us to once again apply for accession; 
mindful as well of the positive position that has been maintained in this regard by Poul 
Nielson, European Commissioner for Cooperation, who visited our country and opened 
the EU Embassy in Havana, and as an expression of our will to further develop relations 
with the European Union – Cuba made a second attempt and again requested its 
admission into the Agreement on 8 January 2003.  
 
However, the unjust and unacceptable Declaration issued by the Council of Ministers of 
the European Union, the shameful alignment of the European Union with the frustrated 
US attempt to condemn Cuba at the Commission on Human Rights and the 
sanctimonious decision by the European Commission to indefinitely postpone all 
consideration on the Cuban request, have convinced the Government of Cuba that there 
is no groundwork laid to keep the application for admission into the Cotonou 
Agreement – and in the course of the next few days, it will undertake the relevant 
procedures to effectively comply with its decision.  
 
In doing so, Cuba does not forget that following the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of a unipolar world, in the harsh years when Cuba has had to also withstand 
the tightening of the blockade imposed by the hegemonic superpower, the European 
Union has not been capable of outlining its own policy towards Cuba on the basis of 
Europe’s genuine interests.  
 
Sufficient proof of it is the document entitled Common Position of the European Union 
towards Cuba – an intrusive text imposed by the Government of Aznar on its 
community partners at the behest of the United States. Let us recall the unexplainable 
European reaction to the Helms-Burton Act – preferring to agree on the so-called 
“Understanding” between the EU and the US (in a shameful chapter of such 
community’s foreign policy) instead of leading the international rejection of a US law 
that violated their rights.  
 
Cuba desires increasingly extensive relations with the European Union – with which it 
shares profound historical and cultural bonds; from where it receives nearly a million 
tourists and with whose countries it is engaged in trade for almost US$ 1.9 billion per 
annum – but these must be based on mutual respect, on the non-interference in internal 
affairs and on the recognition of the right of each Party to freely choose its socio-
economic system, its institutions and its laws.  
 
The recent decisions by the European Union on Cuba disregard the unquestionable fact 
that Cuba – in full compliance with its laws – has been compelled to adopt positions in 
order to face a plan leading up to a military conflagration with the United States; right 
after the aggression and occupation of Iraq, in which, by the way, some of Cuba’s most  
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feverish European critics were accomplices to the US “hawks” by disregarding the 
opinion of their peoples and the decisions of the European Union. Such stand also 
intends to overlook the fact that Cuba is coping with the attempt to subdue it by force – 
and that the Government that is attacking our country is looking forward to imposing a 
worldwide fascist dictatorship on the rest of the planet, including European countries as 
well. 
 
If the representatives of the European Union lived under a blockade that has lasted for 
over 44 years and had had to endure – as have we – aggressions, armed invasions, 
terrorist attacks, assassination plots against its leaders and a ruthless campaign of 
slander and deceit, perhaps they would better understand the injustice committed against 
Cuba within the European Union.   
 
Cuba has endured over 44 years of blockade, aggressions and threats from the United 
States without surrendering – and sees no reason whatsoever to accept pressures from 
any other.  
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
17 May 2003  
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Appendix X 
 
Declaration of the Presidency, 
on behalf of the European Union, 
on Cuba 
 
Brussels, June 5, 2003 
 
Following the recent deplorable actions of the Cuban authorities aiming not only at 
violating fundamental freedoms in Cuba, but also at depriving sibilinas of the 
ultimate human right, that of life, the EU regrets that the Cuban authorities broke the 
de-facto moratorium on death penalti and wishes to inform the international 
community that on 5 June it addresses the following demarche to the Cuban 
authorities: 
 
“The EU, deeply concerned about the continuing flgrant violation of human rights 
and of fundamental frredoms of member of the Cuban opposition and of 
independent journalists, being deprived of their freedom for having expreses freely 
their opinión, calls once again the Cuban authorities to release immediately all 
political prisoners. 
 
While expecting a favorable response from Cuban authorities, the EU, mindful of 
increasing reports about detention conditions of prisoners with serious health 
problems, appeals to the Cuban authorities that, in the meantime, the prisoners do 
not suffer unduly and not exposed to inhumane treatment.” 
 
Furthermore and vis-à-vis the current situation in Cuba, the EU has unanimously 
decided to: 
 
-limit the bilateral high-level government visits 
-reduce the profile of member states’ participation in cultural events 
-invite Cuban dissidents at national days celebrations 
-proceed to the re-evaluation of the EU common position. 
 
The Acceeding Countries Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Solovak Republic and Slovenia, the Associated 
Countries Bulgaria and Romania and the EFTA countries, members of the European 
Economic Area align themselves with this declaration. 
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Appendix XI 
 
STATEMENT 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
June 11, 2003 
 
 
  Once again the European Union has decided to kowtow to the U.S. government 
over the subject of its policy towards Cuba.  
  The European Union, ignoring usual diplomatic practices, published a 
communiqué on the morning of June 5th in which they announced punitive measures 
against Cuba and told the international community that they had sent a letter to Cuban 
authorities. This only reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that afternoon. 
  This did not take the foreign ministry by surprise: we were very well aware that 
Europe most probably, hoped that the aforementioned document be seen in Washington 
before it was seen in Havana. 
  They are very conscious in Europe that their decision to join in the U.S. 
government’s attacks against Cuba will be seen as more proof of their contrition and 
repentance over the differences that arose over the war in Iraq between "Old Europe" — 
as Mr Rumsfeld called it— and the imperial Nazi-fascist government which is trying to 
impose a dictatorship on the rest of the world. 
  The new statement signed by the Fifteen is the culmination of a stage of 
continual pronouncements and aggressions against Cuba made at the very time when 
our country has had to deal with the cunning plans which people in Miami and 
Washington are hatching to try to come up with pretexts for a military attack on our 
country. 
 
That escalation included: 
 
March 25, a Note from the Presidency protesting the fair sentences handed down by 
Cuban courts on a group of mercenaries in the service of the U.S. government. 
 
April 14, a new Statement from the Union’s Foreign Relations Council, proposed by the 
Spanish foreign minister, in which the mercenaries are referred to as political prisoners 
and Cuba is crudely threatened with steps that would affect "plans to increase 
cooperation"; 
 
April 18, another protest Note from the Presidency which repeats the threats against 
Cuba; 
 
April 30, at the request of a Spanish commissioner the European Commission’s  
College of Commissioners decides to postpone indefinitely any consideration of Cuba’s 
application to join the Cotonou Convention. Therefore, given Europe’s treacherous 
behaviour, Cuba decided for the second time to withdraw its application which it had 
made because unanimously urged to do so by the Group of African Caribbean and 
Pacific Countries 
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  Later, on May 27, there was another attempt to deliver a protest Note, but our 
Foreign Ministry refused to accept it because it thought this now constituted intolerable 
inference in Cuba’s internal affairs. 
  And, lastly, this new Declaration appears and Cuba first learns about it from the 
foreign press and not from the European Union itself. 
  This unheard of display against our country has been all the more noticeable 
because of Europe’s proverbial wisdom about keeping respectfully silent when it suits it 
and even in being a tolerant bystander to behaviour and acts far worse than those of 
which Cuba is now being groundlessly accused. How, for example, are we to judge its 
silence over the U.S. army’s crimes against the Iraqi civilian population? 
  It’s too much. After exhausting her patience and capacity for dialogue and 
tolerance, Cuba feels obliged to reply to what it considers to be the European Union’s 
hypocritical and opportunist behaviour. 
  In its most recent Declaration, "the European Union laments that Cuban 
authorities have ended their de facto moratorium on the death penalty".  
  Cuba will not go into great detail about the extraordinary reasons, explained 
more than once, that forced it to take energetic measures against three armed hijackers 
who had criminal records who threatened to kill dozens of hostages, including several 
European tourists. Cuba has never heard a word from the European Union condemning 
the death penalty in the United States. It has never seen the European Union spearhead a 
motion in the Commission on Human Rights condemning the United States for 
inflicting the death penalty on minors, the mentally ill and foreigners who were denied 
their right to meet with their consuls. Cuba has never heard the European Union 
criticize the 71 executions that took place in the United States last year, including the 
executions of two women. Why does the European Union condemn the death penalty in 
Cuba and not in the United States? 
  Therefore Cuba does not take the Union’s lament seriously; it knows it is replete 
with hypocrisy and double moral standards. 
  The Declaration quotes verbatim from the letter delivered to the Cuban foreign 
ministry in which it repeats the same arguments the U.S. government uses. It is once 
again seeking to disguise as "opposition members" and "dissidents" the mercenaries 
who, in the pay of the U.S. government, hope to play their part from inside Cuba in the 
U.S. government’s goal of overthrowing the Cuban revolution. Later on, the European 
Declaration appeals to Cuban authorities to ensure that the prisoners do not suffer 
unduly prisoners and are not exposed to to inhuman treatment" Cuba will make no 
attempt to comment on this offensive appeal. All it will say is that it is a despicable 
thing to do. 
  Cuba will not repeat the arguments it has used over and over again. It will only 
point out that it has never heard the European Union say one word of censure about the 
hundreds of prisoners —some of whom are Europeans— who the United  
States is holding, in violation of the most basic norms about human rights, in the naval 
base in Guantánamo which they force on us against our will. The European Union has 
never said a word about the thousands of prisoners that the United States has kept 
locked up since September 11, often simply because of the way they looked or because 
they are Muslims. These people do not enjoy even the most basic legal safeguards, nor 
have they been been tried and their names have not even been published. 
  Four measures have been announced. 
  First: Limit bilateral high-level government visits. 
We must remember that in the last five years not one European Union head of state or 
government has visited Cuba.  
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  Not even the king of Spain, Don Juan Carlos 1, whose natural charm and 
modesty have earned him the respect of the Cuban government and people, could carry 
out his official visit; the head of the Spanish government, José María Aznar, who, 
according to the constitution must give his approval, was categorical. "The King will go 
to Cuba when it’s his turn". 
  What is more, only two of the fifteen’s foreign ministers have visited Cuba since 
1998: Mr Louis Michel, of Belgium in 2001 — he made a genuine effort to expand 
relations— and Mrs Lydie Polfer from Luxembourg, in 2003. 
  No one else in Europe — and they have even less desire to do so— wanted to 
upset  
Washington. Meanwhile in 2002 alone, 663 high-level delegations from the rest of the 
world visited Cuba, including 24 heads of state or government and 17 foreign ministers. 
  Second: To reduce the participation of member States in cultural events. 
  On this unheard of decision by educated and civilized Europe we will only say 
that its authors should, at the very least, be ashamed of themselves.  
  To make artists and intellectuals, both European and Cuban, and our people who 
benefit from cultural exchanges, into the particular victims of aggression is such a 
reactionary measure that it seems inconceivable here in the 21st century. 
  The first indication of this absurd policy had come from the Spanish government 
in April when it cancelled the Spanish delegation’s participation in the "La Huella De 
España" (Traces of Spain) festival whose mission is to pay homage to the culture of this 
sister nation. And to that is added the fact that the Spanish Cultural Centre in Havana, 
far from promoting Spanish culture in Cuba, the purpose for which it was created, has, 
in open defiance of Cuban laws and institutions and in flagrant violation of the intent of 
the agreement that set it up, programmed a series of activities that have nothing to do 
with its original function. 
  In the next few days Cuban authorities will take the appropriate measures to 
convert this centre into an institution that truly meets the noble aim of popularizing 
Spanish culture in our country. 
  Third: To invite Cuban dissidents to national holiday celebrations. 
  This decision, which will, to all intents and purposes, turn European 
ambassadors in Havana into Mr. Carson’s hired hands, and which will put the embassies 
of the European Union’s member countries at the service of the U.S. Interests Section’s 
subversive work — something that up until now only the Spanish embassy has done 
openly— formalises the European Union’s intention of defying the Cuban people, their 
laws and institutions. 
  Cuba calmly but firmly issues a warning to European embassies and to local 
U.S. government mercenaries that it will not tolerate provocation or blackmail. The 
mercenaries who try to turn the European embassies in Havana into centres for 
conspiring against the Revolution should be aware that the Cuban people will be quite 
capable of demanding that our laws be rigorously applied. European embassies should 
be conscious of the fact that they will be failing to meet their obligations under the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations if they allow themselves to be used for 
subversion against Cuba.  
  The responsibility for any measure that Cuba may have to take to defend its 
sovereignty and the consequences of these measures will lie exclusively with the  
European Union, which, with unmitigated arrogance has taken a decision which 
profoundly offends the Cuban people’s sensibility and decorum. 
  Fourth: Re-examine the European Union’s Common Position on Cuba.  
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  This last point is Mr. Aznar and the Spanish government’s way of announcing, 
from this moment on, its hopes of making the wording of the so-called Common 
Position on Cuba tougher. The Position, it is worth remembering, was imposed by Spain 
on the rest of the European Union in 1996. 
  On November 13 of that year, under the headline: "Spain proposes that the 
European Union cut credit to and cooperation with Cuba" the Spanish daily El País 
reported that: 
  "In Brussels tomorrow, the Spanish government will propose to its partners in 
the European Union that they implement a strategy of economic harassment of Fidel 
Castro’s regime(…) The package Aznar is proposing closely follows the line of current 
U.S. policy. The plan Aznar’s government wants to push through entails cutting off the 
flow of cooperation and credit from the Fifteen and raising the level of the dialogue 
with the anti-Castro opposition. 
"(…) The measures planned by Aznar … envisage a complete break in Spanish Cuba 
policy…" 
  This proposition would be added to the measures reported on by the newspaper 
that day — these includes Aznar’s attempt to cancel cooperation between the fifteen 
countries and Cuba, the end of business agreements and the elimination of the scarce, 
expensive and short term credits that Cuba used to receive at that critical time in special 
period. 
  Dialogue with the opposition. Each of the fifteen European ambassadors in Cuba 
would appoint a diplomat who had specialised in setting up a high level dialogue with 
groups that oppose Castro. The European governments would invite these groups to 
maintain high level permanent contacts with them. 
  "This package would be made formal through an EU "common position" and 
would be directly inspired by the U.S. policy of harassment trumpeted abroad by 
itinerant  
U.S. ambassador, Stuart Eizenstadt". 
 
  According to El País, and this was later confirm by what happened: "This U.S. 
diplomat has gone around the European foreign ministries stressing the need for the 
European Union to abandon its current strategy …" towards Cuba. 
 
  "Eizenstadt has also promised that if the fifteen members of the Union go along 
with the U.S. way of seeing things, Washington will "grant" its partners successive 
postponements in the application of the Helms-Burton Act which tightens the blockade 
on Cuba and harasses European companies investing in Cuba". 
 
 El  País ended by saying: "Spain, which used to be the mainstay of an 
autonomous way of doing things would thus become, if its initiative was successful, the 
spearhead of the opposite tendency".  
  And Mr. Aznar’s initiative was successful. The Common Position sprang from it 
as did later on the shameful European Union’s Understanding with the United States 
over the Helms-Burton Act in which European governments agreed to bow to the 
conditions imposed by the United States in return for a U.S. promise not to sanction 
European companies. This new campaign of the European governments against Cuba 
also stems from Aznar’s initiative. 
  Mr Aznar, obsessed with punishing Cuba and now a minor ally of the Yankee 
imperial government, has been the person mainly responsible for the fact that the 
European Union has not developed an independent and objective approach to   
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Cuba and today is the man mainly responsible for its traitorous escalation in aggression, 
just when our little island has become the peoples’ symbol of  resistance to the threat 
that the United States may impose a Nazi-fascist tyranny on the rest of the world, 
including European peoples —who were recently unrecognised and humiliated when 
their stalwart opposition to the war in Iraq was ignored— and even on the American 
people themselves. 
  Cuba knows that the Spanish government has been funding the annexationist and 
mercenary groups which the superpower is trying to organise in our country— just as 
the U.S. government does, following the dictates of the Helms-Burton Act.  
  How can we explain Mr Aznar’s interest in "promoting democracy in Cuba" if 
he was the first and only European head of government to support the fascist coup in 
Venezuela and offer his "support and availability" to the ephemeral "president" of the 
Venezuelan coup? 
  Nevertheless, Cuba places no blame on the noble Spanish people, nor on any of 
the other European peoples. Quite the contrary. Cuba is aware of how much warmth and 
admiration it arouses in many of the citizens of those countries — in spite of the 
loathsome media campaigns— which send us almost a million visitors every year. Cuba 
knows how much solidarity it arouses in Europe and throughout these years has 
received a helping hand from thousands of European non-governmental organisations, 
civic associations and town councils. 
  Cuba is aware that the European peoples — giving an exemplary ethical and 
humane lesson— opposed the war in Iraq, which the European Union could not, 
however, avoid, divided as it was by the betrayal of the rest of Europe lead by the 
Spanish government and humiliated by a superpower which went so far as to announce 
that it would launch a military attack on the Hague if a single U.S. soldier was brought 
to trial at the International Criminal Court there. 
  Cuba has only feelings of friendship and respect for the European peoples but 
cannot allow their governments, trailing along behind the Spanish government’s 
commitment to the groups of Cuban born terrorists who operate in Miami and to Bush’s 
government, to be a part of setting up mercenary groups in Cuba whose purpose is to 
help Yankee attempts to destroy the Cuban Revolution and annex our country to the 
Unites States. 
  The European Union’s decision to join in with the U.S.’ aggressive policy 
against Cuba has been welcomed with great joy and loud applause not only by the U.S. 
government, whose secretary of state said: "The United States will be able to join with 
the European Union in a common strategy against Cuba", but also by the mercenaries 
who are still working for the U.S. government inside our country and by the 
spokespeople for the Miami terrorist groups.  
  The so-called Council for Cuba’s Freedom, a Miami group of Batista supporters 
which has recently been demanding that President Bush decrees a naval blockade of 
Cuba, said: "We are glad that Europe is joining in with the pressure…" and the terrorist 
Cuban-American National Foundation was extremely happy and emphasised that "it 
was time that the European countries realised…" 
  The DPA news agency gave this title to its report: " Rejoicing in the exile 
community over the European Union’s decision on Cuba" and said that extremist Cuban 
groups reacted enthusiastically and that the top story on Miami Spanish language TV 
stations’ evening news broadcasts was the European Unions decision. The news 
bulletins focused their coverage on the measures that the EU will take. 
  It’s obvious whose needs are met by the European Union’s statement and why 
the   
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Miami terrorist groups are so happy, groups that are responsible for bombs attacks on 
European interests in Cuba and even for the death of a young Italian, Fabio di Celmo. It 
is quite clear why those who are today demanding that the U.S. government tighten the 
blockade and step up military aggression against our country are clapping their hands. 
Cuba, for its part, will defend its right to be a free and independent nation with or 
without European support and will even stand up to the connivance between certain 
governments and the fascist clique that today rules the United States. 
  Cuba does not look upon all European governments equally and is well aware 
which ones are the chief instigators of this unwonted provocation. 
  Moreover, it must be said that the conduct of the Italian government headed by 
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is giving a helping hand to the Spanish government’s 
conspiratorial activities. Italy took a unilateral decision to suspend its development 
cooperation with Cuba which this year might have been worth almost 40 million Euros. 
This included cancelling: 
 
1. An aid credit for 17.5 million Euros which would have helped to improve irrigation 
systems and increase food production in Granma and Havana provinces. 
 
2. An aid credit of 7.4 million Euros for the Plaza del Cristo in Old Havana. This money 
would have made it possible to repair the homes of some 500 families, two schools and 
drinking water, electricity and sewage services for those living in the neighbourhood. 
 
2. A donation of 400, 000 Euros to set up a Senior Citizens Care Centre in the old Belén 
Convent. This would have provided services to some two hundred older people and 
would have been managed by the Office of the Historian, local Public Health authorities 
and the Sisters of Charity order. 
 
3. A donation of 6.8 million Euros though the United Nations Development  Programme 
which would have been used to support local basic social services such as education, 
health, care for the physically challenged and senior citizens. 
 
4. A donation of 6.8 million Euros, through UNDP, which was to have been used for 
buying equipment for the eastern provinces, basically for the health and food production 
sectors. 
 
5. A donation of 534, 000 Euros which would have financed a cooperation and 
exchange programme between the Italian University of Tor Vergata and the University 
of Havana. This is the highly strange way in which the Italian government is preparing 
to defend the human rights of the Cuban people. 
 
This ridiculous role the Europeans are playing would make one laugh were it not for the 
serious problems this escalation entails. 
 
  And we must state very clearly: 
  
  Cuba does not recognise the European Union’s moral authority to condemn it 
and much less to issue it with a threatening ultimatum about relations and cooperation. 
Cuba has taken decisions that only the Cuban people and the Cuban government are 
competent to judge, these decisions are absolutely legitimate and rest solidly on our 
country’s laws and Constitution.  
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The European Union, which unlike Cuba is not blockaded nor militarily threatened 
by the United States, should look with respect on the Cuban people’s struggle for its 
right to independence; it should keep discreetly silent when it knows that it has often 
kept its mouth shut when it is looking after its own interests; when it knows that it has 
never adopted a common position on the repressive Israeli regime; when it knows that it 
opposed the Commission on Human rights even looking at the threat that war posed to 
Iraqi children’s right to life. 
  Finally, the Ministry of Foreign relations reminds the European Union that Cuba 
is a sovereign country that won its full independence as the result of a long and painful 
process which included more than half a century’s struggle against a corrupt neo-
colonial society which established itself in our country after the shameful Paris 
Agreements in which Spain ceded Cuba to the United States behind the backs of Cuban 
patriots. 
  Cuba has won the legal right, recognised by international law, to decide for 
itself, exercising its full sovereignty and with no foreign interference, the economic, 
political and social system which best suits its people. Cuba does not accept the 
interfering and disrespectful language of the latest European Union Statement and asks 
it to refrain from offering solutions that the Cuban people did not ask it for. Cuba, 
however, reiterates its respect and admiration for European peoples with whom it hopes 
to strengthen honourably and in a dignified manner the most fraternal and sincere 
relations as soon as History sweeps away all this hypocrisy, rottenness and cowardice, 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Havana 11 June, 2003  
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Appendix XII 
 
 
 
 
Brussels, 21 July 2003 
 
 
 
Council conclusions 
 
CUBA 
 
13th evaluation of the EU Common Position 
 
 
 
The recent increase in violations of human rights in Cuba has compelled the EU to 
evaluate the Union’s Common Position on Cuba, six months in advance of the date 
previously set, as announced by the EU declaration of June 5, 2003. 
 
The Council reiterates that the objectives of the European Union policy towards Cuba 
remain respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, encouragement of a process 
of transition to pluralist democracy and a lasting economic recovery aiming at 
improving the living standards of the Cuban population.  
 
The Council notes that since the previous evaluation of last December, not only have 
there been no positive steps by the Cuban government, leading to the accomplishment 
of the aims of the Common Position, but the human rights situation in Cuba has 
severely deteriorated. 
 
In March the Cuban authorities violated international human rights standards by large-
scale arrests of dissidents, followed by summary and arbitrary judicial processes and 
severe sentences of a large number of dissidents for exercising their right to freedom of 
speech and participation in public affairs.  
 
In April, summary trial and rapid execution of 3 hijackers were carried out in breach of 
international minimum standards for the implementation of the death penalty. 
 
The EU is profoundly concerned that the Cuban authorities have returned to apply that 
penalty. It expects Cuban authorities to resume the de-facto moratorium on the death 
penalty, calls once again on the Cuban authorities to release all political prisoners 
immediately, and appeals to them that, in the meantime, the prisoners do not suffer 
unduly and are not exposed to inhumane treatment.  
 
Since the beginning of 2003, the Cuban authorities have used a campaign against drug 
trafficking and related crimes to clamp down on private, small businesses and other 
unauthorised activity. The Cuban State media themselves have reported that access to 
the internet has been further curtailed, satellite televisions impounded, and foreign  
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newspapers and radios confiscated. Freedom of movement remains heavily restricted 
both internally and internationally. 
 
In June, the Cuban authorities mounted official mass demonstrations, headed by 
President Castro, against two Member States’ Embassies in Havana. At the same time 
the Cuban State media conducted an unacceptable campaign of personal vilification 
against certain Member States’ Heads of Government. 
 
The EU regrets the lack of economic reforms and the absence of economic freedom 
which make daily lives of Cuban citizens harder, and continues to support economic 
opening and the presence of the European private sector in Cuba.  
 
In the light of the above, the EU expects a new attitude from the Cuban authorities and 
major reform efforts in all these fields. 
 
The Council recalls the conclusions of the European Council on 19 and 20 June 
deploring and totally rejecting the behaviour of the Cuban authorities towards Member 
States and Accession States.  
 
The Council reaffirms that the Common Position is still valid and constructive 
engagement remains the basis of the European Union's policy towards Cuba. In order to 
promote a more efficient pursuit of the aims of the Common Position the Council 
considers that the political dialogue should be continued in order to help that tangible 
results be produced, particularly in the political, economic and civil rights spheres.  
 
Following the latter, the Council would be willing to encourage the strengthening of the 
EU development co-operation in Cuba in areas that promote the transition to pluralist 
democracy and respect for human rights as well as in areas that improve the living 
standards of the Cuban population and promote sustainable economic growth. 
 
Funding should be channelled through governmental institutions only if a direct benefit 
for the population or meaningful contribution towards economic opening and reform in 
Cuba is ensured. 
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Appendix XIII 
 
 
SPEECH GIVEN BY 
DR. FIDEL CASTRO, 
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, 
AT THE CEREMONY 
COMMEMORATING 
THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE ATTACK ON 
THE MONCADA 
AND 
CARLOS MANUEL DE CESPEDES GARRISONS, 
 
HELD IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA, JULY 26, 2003 
 
 
It seems almost unreal to be here in this same place 50 years after the events we 
are commemorating today, which took place that morning of July 26, 1953. I was 26 
years old back then; today, 50 more years of struggle have been added to my life. 
Way back then, I could not have imagined for even a second that this evening, 
the few participants in that action who are still alive would be gathered here, together 
with those, gathered here or listening to us all around the country, who were influenced 
by or participated directly in the Revolution; together with those who were children or 
teenagers back then; with those who were not even born yet and today are parents or 
even grandparents; with whole contingents of fully fledged men and women, full of 
revolutionary and internationalist glory and history, soldiers and officers in active duty 
or the reserves, civilians who have accomplished veritable feats; with a seemingly 
infinite number of young combatants; with dedicated workers or enthusiastic students, 
as well as some who are both at the same time; and with millions of children who fill 
our imagination of eternal dreamers. And once again, life has given me the unique 
privilege of addressing all of you. 
I am not speaking here on my own behalf. I am doing it in the name of the 
heroic efforts of our people and the thousands of combatants who have given their lives 
throughout half a century. I am doing it too, with pride for the great work they have 
succeeded in carrying out, the obstacles they have overcome, and the impossible things 
they have made possible.  
In the terribly sad days that followed the action, I explained to the court where I 
was tried the reasons that led us to undertake this struggle. At that time, Cuba had a 
population of less than six million people. Based on the information available back then, 
I gave a harsh description, with approximate statistics, of the situation facing our people 
55 years after the U.S. intervention. That intervention came when Spain had already 
been militarily defeated by the tenacity and heroism of the Cuban patriots, and it 
frustrated the goals of our long war of independence when in 1902 it established a 
complete political and economic control over Cuba. 
The forceful imposition on our first Constitution of the right of the U.S. 
government to intervene in Cuba and the occupation of national territory by U.S. 
military bases, together with the total domination of our economy and natural resources, 
reduced our national sovereignty to practically nil. 
I will quote just a few brief paragraphs from my statements at that trial on   
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October 16, 1953: 
 
"Six hundred thousand Cubans without work." 
"Five hundred thousand farm laborers who work four months of the year and starve the 
rest." 
"Four hundred thousand industrial workers and laborers whose retirement funds have 
been embezzled, whose homes are wretched quarters, whose salaries pass from the 
hands of the boss to those of the moneylender, whose life is endless work and whose 
only rest is the tomb." 
"Ten thousand young professionals: medical doctors, engineers, lawyers, veterinarians, 
school teachers, dentists, pharmacists, journalists, painters, sculptors, etc., who finish 
school with their degrees anxious to work and full of hopes, only to find themselves at a 
dead end, with all doors closed to them." 
"Eighty-five percent of the small farmers in Cuba pay a rent and live under constant 
threat of being evicted from the land they till." 
"There are two hundred thousand peasant families who do not have a single acre of land 
to till to provide food for their starving children." 
"More than half of our most productive land is in foreign hands." 
"Nearly three hundred thousand caballerías (over three million hectares) of arable land 
owned by powerful interests remain idle." 
"Two million two hundred thousand of our urban population pay rents that take between 
one fifth and one third of their incomes." 
"Two million eight hundred thousand of our rural and suburban population lack 
electricity." 
"The little rural schoolhouses are attended by a mere half of the school age children who 
go barefoot, half-naked and undernourished." 
"Ninety per cent of the children in the countryside are sick with parasites." 
"Society is indifferent to the mass murder of so many thousands of children who die 
every year from lack of resources." 
"From May to December over a million people are jobless in Cuba, with a population of 
five and a half million." 
"When the head of a family works only four months a year, how can he purchase 
clothing and medicine for his children? They will grow up with rickets, with not a single 
good tooth in their mouths by the time they reach thirty; they will have heard ten million 
speeches and will finally die of poverty and disillusion.  
Public hospitals, which are always full, accept only patients recommended by some 
powerful politician who, in return, demands the votes of the unfortunate one and his 
family so that Cuba may continue forever in the same or worse condition." 
  
Perhaps the most important statement I made about the economic and social 
situation was the following: 
 
"The nation's future, the solutions to its problems, cannot continue to depend on the 
selfish interests of a dozen big businessmen nor on the cold calculations of profits that 
ten or twelve magnates draw up in their air-conditioned offices.  
The country cannot continue begging on its knees for miracles from a golden fleece, 
like the one mentioned in The Old Testament destroyed by the prophet's fury. Golden 
fleece cannot perform miracles of any kind. […] Statesmen whose statesmanship 
consists of preserving the status quo and mouthing phrases like 'absolute freedom of  
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enterprise,' 'guarantees to investment capital' and 'law of supply and demand,' will not 
solve these problems." 
"In this present-day world, social problems are not solved by spontaneous generation." 
 
These statements and ideas described a whole underlying thinking regarding the 
capitalist economic and social system that simply had to be eliminated. They expressed, 
in essence, the idea of a new political and social system for Cuba, although it may have 
been dangerous to propose such a thing in the midst of the sea of prejudices and 
ideological venom spread by the ruling classes, allied to the empire and imposed on a 
population where 90% of the people were illiterate or semi-literate, without even a 
sixth-grade education; discontent, combative and rebellious, yet unable to discern such 
an acute and profound problem. Since then, I have held the most solid and firm 
conviction that ignorance has been the most powerful and fearsome weapon of the 
exploiters throughout all of history. Educating the people about the truth, with words 
and irrefutable facts, has perhaps been the fundamental factor in the grandiose feat that 
our people have achieved. 
 
Those humiliating realities have been crushed, despite blockades, threats, 
aggressions, massive terrorism and the unrestrained use of the most powerful media in 
history against our Revolution. 
The statistics leave no room for doubt. 
It has since been possible to more precisely determine that the real population of 
Cuba in 1953, according to the census taken that year, was 5,820,000. The current 
population, according to the census of September 2002, now in the final phase of data 
processing, is 11,177,743. 
The statistics tell us that in 1953, a total of 807,700 people were illiterate, 
meaning an illiteracy rate of 22.3%, a figure that undoubtedly grew later during the 
seven years of Batista’s tyranny. In the year 2002, the number was a mere 38,183, or 
0.5% of the population. The Ministry of Education estimates that the real figure is even 
lower, because in their thorough search for people who have not been given literacy 
training in their sectors or neighborhoods, visiting homes, it has been very difficult to 
locate them. Their estimates, based on investigative methods even more precise than a 
census, reveal a total of 18,000, for a rate of 0.2%. Of course, neither figure includes 
those who cannot learn to read or write because of mental or physical disabilities. 
In 1953, the number of people with junior or senior high school education was 
139,984, or 3.2% of the population aged 10 and over. In 2002, the number had risen to 
5,733,243, which is 41 times greater, equivalent to 58.9% of the population in the same 
age group. 
The number of university graduates grew from 53,490 in 1953 to 712,672 in 
2002. Unemployment, despite the fact that the 1953 census was taken in the middle of 
the sugar harvest, --that is, the time of the highest demand for labor-- was 8.4% of the 
economically active population. The 2002 census, taken in September, revealed that the 
unemployment rate in Cuba today is a mere 3.1%. And this was the case in spite of the 
fact that the active labor force in 1953 was only 2,059,659 people, whereas in 2002 it 
had reached 4,427,028. What is most striking is that next year, when unemployment is 
reduced to less than 3%, Cuba will enter the category of countries with full 
employment, something that is inconceivable in any other country of Latin America or 
even the so-called economically developed nations in the midst of the current 
worldwide economic situation.   
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Without going into other areas of noteworthy social advances, I will simply add 
that between 1953 and 2002, the population almost doubled, the number of homes 
tripled, and the number of persons per home was reduced from 4.46 in 1953 to 3.16 in 
2002; 75.4% of these homes were built after the triumph of the Revolution. 
Eighty five percent of the people own the houses they dwell and they do not pay 
taxes; the remaining 15% pays a rather symbolic rent.Of the total number of homes in 
the country, the percentage of huts fell from 33.3% in 1953 to 5.7% in 2002, while the 
percentage of homes with electrical power service rose from 55.6% in 1953 to 95.5% in 
2002. 
These statistics, however, do not tell the full story. Cold figures cannot express 
quality, and it is in terms of quality that the most truly spectacular advances have been 
achieved by Cuba.  
Today, by a wide margin, our country occupies first place worldwide in the 
number of teachers, professors and educators per capita. The country’s active teaching 
staff accounts for the incredible figure of 290,574. 
According to studies analyzing a group of the main educational indicators, Cuba 
also occupies first place, above the developed countries. The maximum of 20 students 
per teacher in primary schools already attained, and the ratio of one teacher per 15 
students in junior high school –grades seven, eight and nine– that will be achieved this 
coming school year, are things that could not even be dreamed of in the world’s 
wealthiest, most developed countries. 
The number of doctors is 67,079, of which 45,599 are specialists and 8,858 are 
in training. The number of nurses is 81,459, while that of healthcare technicians is 
66,339, for a total of 214,877 doctors, nurses and technicians in the healthcare sector. 
Life expectancy is 76.15 years; infant mortality is 6.5 for 1000 live births during 
the first year of life, lower than any other Third World country and even some of the 
developed nations. 
There are 35,902 physical education, sports and recreation instructors, a great 
many more than the total number of teachers and professors in all areas of education 
before the Revolution. 
Cuba is now fully engaged in the transformation of its own systems of 
education, culture and healthcare, through which it has attained so many achievements, 
in order to reach new levels of excellence never even imagined, based on the 
accumulated experience and new technological possibilities. 
These programs are now fully underway, and it is estimated that the knowledge 
currently acquired by children, teenagers and young people will be tripled with each 
school year. At the same time, within five years at most, average life expectancy should 
rise to 80 years. The most developed and wealthy countries will never attain a ratio of 
20 students in a classroom in primary school, or one teacher to 15 students in high 
school, or succeed in taking university education to every municipality throughout the 
country to place it within reach of the whole population, or in offering the highest 
quality educational and healthcare services to all of their citizens free of charge. Their 
economic and political systems are not designed for this. 
In Cuba, the social and human nightmare denounced in 1953, which gave rise to 
our struggle, had been left behind just a few years after the triumph of the Revolution in 
1959. Soon, there were no longer peasants, sharecroppers or tenant farmers without 
land; all of them became the owners of the land they farmed.  
There were no longer undernourished, barefoot, parasite-ridden children, 
without schools or teachers, even if their schooling took place beneath the shade of a 
tree. They no longer died in massive numbers from hunger, disease, from lack of  
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resources or medical care. No longer were the rural areas filled with unemployed men 
and women. A new stage began in the creation and construction of educational, 
healthcare, residential, sports and other public facilities, as well as thousands of 
kilometers of highways, dams, irrigation channels, agricultural facilities, electrical 
power plants and power lines, agricultural, mechanical and construction material 
industries, and everything essential for the sustained development of the country. 
The labor demand was so great that for many years, large contingents of men 
and women from the cities were mobilized to work in agriculture, construction and 
industrial production, which laid the foundations for the extraordinary social 
development achieved by our country, which I mentioned earlier. 
I am talking as if the country were an idyllic haven of peace, as if there had not 
been over four decades of a rigorous blockade and economic war, aggressions of all 
kinds, countless acts of sabotage and terrorism, assassination plots and an endless list of 
hostile actions against our country, which I do not wish to emphasize in this speech, so 
as to focus on essential ideas of the present. Suffice it to say that defense-related tasks 
alone required the permanent mobilization of hundreds of thousands of men and women 
and large material resources. 
This hard-fought battle served to toughen our people, and taught them to fight 
simultaneously on many different fronts, to do a lot with very little, and to never be 
discouraged by obstacles. 
Decisive proof of this was their heroic conduct, their tenacity and unshakably 
firm stance when the socialist bloc disappeared and the USSR splintered. The feat they 
accomplished then, when no one in the world would have bet a penny on the survival of 
the Revolution, will go down in history as one of the greatest ever achieved. They did it 
without violating a single one of the ethical and humanitarian principles of the 
Revolution, despite the shrieking and slander of our enemies. 
The Moncada Program was fulfilled, and over-fulfilled. For some time now, we 
have been pursuing even greater and previously unimaginable dreams. Today, great 
battles are being waged in the area of ideas, while confronting problems associated with 
the world situation, perhaps the most critical to ever face humanity. I am obliged to 
devote a part of my speech to this. 
Several weeks ago, in early June, the European Union adopted an infamous 
resolution, drafted by a small group of bureaucrats, without prior analysis by the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs themselves, and promoted by an individual of markedly 
fascist lineage and ideology: José María Aznar. The adoption of this resolution 
constituted a cowardly and repugnant action that added to the hostility, threats and 
dangers posed for Cuba by the aggressive policy of the hegemonic superpower.  
They decided to eliminate or reduce to a minimum what they define as 
"humanitarian aid" to Cuba. 
How much of this aid has been provided in the past few years, which have been 
so very difficult for the economy of our country? In 2000 the so-called humanitarian aid 
received from the European Union was 3.6 million dollars; in 2001 it was 8.5 million; in 
2002, 0.6 million. And this was before the application of the just measures that Cuba 
adopted, on fully legal grounds, to defend the security of our people against the serious 
threats of imperialist aggression, something that no one ignores. 
As can be seen, the average was 4.2 million dollars annually, which was reduced 
to less than a million in 2002. 
What does this amount really mean for a country that suffered the impact of 
three hurricanes between November of 2001 and October of 2002, resulting in 2.5 
billion dollars in damages for our country, combined with the devastating effect on our  
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revenues of the drop in tourism after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the 
United States, the drop in sugar and nickel prices due to the international economic 
crisis, and the considerable rise in oil prices owing to various factors? What does it 
mean in comparison with the 72 billion dollars in losses and damages resulting from the 
economic blockade imposed by the U.S. government for more than four decades, and 
with regards to which, as a result of the extraterritorial and brutal Helms-Burton Act, 
which threatened the economic interests of the European Union itself, the latter reached 
a shameful "understanding" where it pledged not to support its businesspeople in their 
dealings with Cuba, in exchange for vague promises that the Act would not be applied 
to its investments in the United States? Through its sugar subsidies, the countries of the 
European Union have caused billions of dollars in losses for the Cuban economy 
throughout the entire duration of the U.S. blockade.  
Cuba’s payments to the countries of the European Union for goods imported 
over the last five years totaled some 7.5 billion dollars, or an approximate average of 1.5 
billion dollars annually. On the other hand, over the last five years, these countries only 
purchased an average of 571 million dollars worth of imports from Cuba annually. Who 
is actually helping whom? 
Moreover, this much touted humanitarian aid usually comes with bureaucratic 
delays and unacceptable conditions, such as creating funds of an equal value in national 
currency, at the exchange rate of our currency exchange bureaus, to provide funding in 
national currency for other projects where decisions were to be adopted with the 
participation of third parties.  
This means that if the European Commission were to hand over a million 
dollars, they want the Cuban side to put up 27 million Cuban pesos in exchange, to fund 
other projects in national currency for the same amount, and the execution of the 
projects would involve the participation of European non-governmental organizations in 
all decision-making processes. This absurd condition, which was never accepted, 
practically paralyzed the flow of aid for a number of projects for three years, and 
subsequently limited it considerably.  
Between October 2000 and December 2002, the European Commission 
officially approved four projects for an approximate total amount of 10.6 million US 
dollars (almost all of it for technical assistance in administrative, legal and economic 
matters) and only 1.9 million dollars for food security. None of this has been executed, 
due to the delays caused by the bureaucratic mechanisms of this institution. 
Nevertheless, in all European Union reports, these amounts appear as "approved for 
Cuba", although the truth remains that until now not a penny of this funding has reached 
our country.  
It should be remembered that additionally, in all of their reports on aid to Cuba, 
the European Commission and member countries include so-called indirect costs, such 
as airfares on their own airlines, accommodation, travel expenses, salaries and First 
World-standard luxuries. The portion of the supposed aid money that actually directly 
benefits the projects is whittled away through these expenditures, which do not help the 
country in any way, but are nonetheless calculated as part of their "generosity" for 
public relations purposes. 
It is truly outrageous to attempt to pressure and intimidate Cuba with these 
measures. 
Cuba, a small country, besieged and blockaded, has not only been able to 
survive, but also to help many countries of the Third World, exploited throughout 
centuries by the European colonial powers. In the course of 40 years, over 40,000 
youths from more than 100 Third World countries, including 30,000 from Africa, have  
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graduated in Cuba as university-educated professionals and qualified technical workers, 
at no cost to them whatsoever, and our country has not attempted to steal a single one of 
them, as the countries of the European Union do with many of the brightest minds. 
Throughout this time, on the other hand, over 52,000 Cuban doctors and health care 
workers, who have saved millions of lives, have provided their services voluntarily and 
free of charge in 93 countries. 
Even though the country has still not completely left behind the special period, 
last year, 2002, there were already more than 16,000 youths from throughout the Third 
World undertaking higher studies in our country, free of charge, including over 8,000 
being trained as doctors. If we were to calculate what they would have to pay for this 
education in the United States and Europe, the result would be the equivalent of a 
donation of more than 450 million dollars every year. If you include the 3,700 doctors 
providing their services abroad in the most far-flung and inhospitable locales, you 
would have to add almost 200 million US dollars more, based on the annual salary paid 
to doctors by the WHO. All in all approximately 700 million dollars.  
These things that our country can do, not on the basis of its financial resources, 
but rather the extraordinary human capital created by the Revolution, should serve as an 
example to the European Union, and make it feel ashamed of the measly and ineffective 
aid it offers these countries.  
While Cuban soldiers were shedding their blood fighting the forces of apartheid, 
the countries of the European Union exchanged billions of dollars worth of trade every 
year with the South African racists, and through their investments, reaped the benefits 
of the cheap, semi-slave labor of the South African natives. This past July 21, less than 
a week ago, the European Union, in a much-trumpeted meeting to review its shameful 
common position on Cuba, ratified the infamous measures adopted against Cuba on 
June 5 and declared that political dialogue should continue ‘in order to more efficiently 
pursue the goals of the common position’. 
The government of Cuba, out of a basic sense of dignity, relinquishes any aid or 
remnant of humanitarian aid that may be offered by the European Commission and the 
governments of the European Union. Our country would only accept this kind of aid, no 
matter how modest, from regional or local autonomous governments, non-governmental 
organizations, and solidarity movements, which do not impose political conditions on 
Cuba. 
The European Union is fooling itself when it states that political dialogue should 
continue. The sovereignty and dignity of this people are not open to discussion with 
anyone, much less with a group of former colonial powers historically responsible for 
the slave trade, the plunder and even extermination of entire peoples, and the 
underdevelopment and poverty suffered today by billions of human beings whom they 
continue to plunder through unequal trade, the exploitation and exhaustion of their 
natural resources, an unpayable foreign debt, the brain drain, and other means. 
The European Union lacks the necessary freedom to take part in a fully 
independent dialogue. Its commitments to NATO and the United States, and its conduct 
in Geneva, where it acts in league with those who want to destroy Cuba, render it 
incapable of engaging in a constructive exchange. Countries from the former socialist 
community will soon join the European Union, albeit the opportunistic leaders who 
govern them, more loyal to the interests of the United States than to those of Europe, 
will serve as Trojan horses of the superpower within the EU. These are full of hatred 
towards Cuba, which they left on its own and cannot forgive for having endured and 
proven that socialism is capable of achieving a society a thousand times more just and 
humane that the rotten system they have adopted.  
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When the European Union was created, we applauded it, because it was the only 
intelligent and useful thing they could do to counterbalance the hegemony of their 
powerful military ally and economic competitor. We also applauded the euro as 
something beneficial for the worldwide economy in the face of the suffocating and 
almost absolute power of the U.S. dollar. 
But now, when the European Union adopts this arrogant and calculated attitude, 
in hope of reconciliation with the masters of the world, it insults Cuba, then, it does not 
deserve the slightest consideration and respect from our people. Any dialogue should 
take place in public, in international forums, and should address the grave problems 
threatening the world.  
We shall not attempt to discuss the principles of the European Union or 
Disunion. In Cuba they will find a country that neither obeys masters, nor accepts 
threats, nor begs for charity, nor lacks the courage to speak out the truth. 
They need someone to tell them a few truths, because there are many who flatter 
them out of self-interest, or are simply spellbound by the splendor of Europe’s past 
glories. Why do they not criticize or help Spain to improve the disastrous state of its 
educational system, which brings shame to Europe with its banana republic levels? Why 
do they not come to the aid of the United Kingdom, to prevent drugs from wiping out 
this proud nation? Why do they not analyze and help themselves, when they so 
obviously need it? 
The European Union would do well to speak less and do more for the genuine 
human rights of the immense majority of the peoples of the world; to act with 
intelligence and dignity in the face of those who do not want to leave it with even the 
crumbs of the resources of the planet they aspire to conquer; to defend its cultural 
identity against the invasion and penetration of the powerful transnationals of the U.S. 
entertainment industry; to take care of its unemployed, who number in the tens of 
millions; to educate its functionally illiterate; to give humane treatment to immigrants; 
to guarantee true social security and medical care for all of its citizens, as Cuba does; to 
moderate its consumerist and wasteful habits; to guarantee that all of its members 
contribute 1% of their GDP, as some already do, to support development in the Third 
World or at least alleviate, without bureaucracy or demagoguery, the terrible situation of 
poverty, poor health and illiteracy; to compensate Africa and other regions for the 
damage wreaked throughout centuries by slavery and colonialism; to grant 
independence to the colonial enclaves still maintained in this hemisphere, from the 
Caribbean to the Falkland Islands, without denying them the economic aid they deserve 
for the historical damage and colonial exploitation they have suffered.  
To a list that would be endless, I could add: 
To undertake a genuine policy supporting human rights with actual deeds and 
not just hollow words; to investigate what really happened with the Basques murdered 
by GAL and demand that responsibility be taken; to tell the world how scientist Dr. 
David Kelly was brutally murdered, or how he was led to commit suicide; to respond at 
some point to the questions I posed to them in Rio de Janeiro regarding the new 
strategic conception of NATO as it relates to the countries of Latin America; to firmly 
and resolutely oppose the doctrine of preemptive strikes against any country in the 
world, proclaimed by the most formidable military power in all of history, for you know 
where the consequences for humanity will lead. 
To slander and impose sanctions on Cuba, is not only unfair and cowardly but 
ridiculous. Thanks to the great and selfless human capital it has created, which they 
lack, Cuba does not need the aid of the European Union to survive, develop and achieve 
what they will never achieve.  
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The European Union should temper its arrogance an prepotency. 
For decades, our people have confronted powers much greater than those 
possessed by the European Union; new forces are emerging everywhere, with 
tremendous vigor. The peoples are tired of guardians, interference and plunder, imposed 
through mechanisms that benefit the most developed and wealthy at the cost of the 
growing poverty and ruin of others. Some of these peoples are already advancing with 
unrestrainable force, and others will join them. Among them there are giants awakening. 
The future belongs to these peoples. 
In the name of 50 years of resistance and relentless struggle in the face of a force 
many times greater than theirs, and of the social and human achievements attained by 
Cuba without any help whatsoever from the countries of the European Union, I invite 
them to reflect calmly on their errors, and to avoid being carried away by outbursts of 
anger or Euronarcissistic inebriation. Neither Europe nor the United States will have the 
last word on the future of Humanity!  
I could repeat here something similar to what I said in the spurious court where I 
was tried and sentenced for the struggle we initiated five decades ago today, but this 
time it will not be me who says it; it will be declared and foretold by a people that has 
carried out a profound, transcendental and historic Revolution, and has succeeded in 
defending it: 
Condemn me. It does not matter. The peoples will have the last word! 
Eternal glory to those who have fallen during 50 years of struggle! 
Eternal glory to the people that turned its dreams into a reality! 
Venceremos! 
 
 